In the first
essay of this series, I mentioned that the idea and institution of democracy
have four sources affecting its development: the classical Greek democracy,
the republican tradition, the theory and practice of representative
government, and the logic of political equality. The focus of this essay
is on the theory and practice of representative government and its relations
with democracy.
For more
than two thousand years before the 17th century, the idea of a representative
democracy was never explored by students and practitioners of politics.
In the ancient Greek polis, there was no need to worry about representation
because, given the small size of the polity, every citizen could in
principle participate directly in public debate and decision-making.
Indeed, the Greek democrats would have hated representation because
it probably would have violated their understanding of democracy. A
more puzzling case is the Roman empire. Although the Roman empire expanded
to a great territory, the Roman republicans were never concerned about
the actuality of political participation by citizens living far away
from Rome, where the assembly met regularly. In fact, most citizens
of the Roman empire probably never attended an assembly, and the situation
created a random and skewed system of representation --- those living
close to Rome became de facto "representatives" of other citizens
of the Roman empire. Later, the Renaissance Italian city-states, again
of small size, also failed to see the need for a system of representative
government.
It is
surprising, however, given the existence of large democratic or republican
regimes (such as the Roman empire) in human history, that the idea and
institution of representative government completely escaped the minds
of politicians and political philosophers. Indeed, not only was there
a lack of understanding on the institution of representative government,
there was also a sentiment among students of democracy that a representative
system of government is undemocratic and is therefore not a good political
arrangement. Even in the 18th century, there were radical arguments
against representative government. For example, Rousseau argues in the
"Social Contract" that representation is impermissible because
"[s]overeignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it
cannot be alienated." To Rousseau, the English people were "mistaken"
when they believed themselves to be free. They were free "only
during the election of the members of Parliament. Once they are elected,
the populace is enslaved; it is nothing" (Book 3, Chapter 15).
The English
Civil War started to change the intellectual and political landscape
in Europe. In their search for a republican alternative to the monarchical
structure of the government, the Puritans, particularly the Levellers,
foresaw the modern institution of representative government. However,
the general acceptance of representative government as a necessary and
desirable institution of democracy was still one century away. Even
Locke, the father of liberalism who agrees to the legitimacy of representative
government, had little to say about representation in his two treatises
on government.
Interestingly,
representation was not initially developed as a democratic institution.
Instead, it was initially used by monarchs and aristocrats in the Middle
Ages. According to Professor Robert Dahl, the beginnings of representative
government "are to be found, notably in England and Sweden, in
the assemblies summoned by monarchs, or sometimes the nobles themselves,
to deal with important matters of state: revenues, wars, royal succession,
and the like. In the typical pattern, those summoned were drawn from
and were intended to represent the various estates, with the representatives
from each estate meeting separately. Over time, the estates diminished
to two, lords and commoners, who were of course represented in separate
houses" (Dahl, 1989, p. 29).
By the
eighteenth century, political philosophers as well as politicians started
to appreciate what Levellers had seen earlier: by marrying the institution
of representative government with democracy, nations could eliminate
"the practical limits that a sizeable citizentry imposes on democracy,
which had been the focus of so much critical (anti-democratic) attention...
Representative democracy could [then] be celebrated as both accountable
and feasible government, potentially stable over great territories and
time spans" (Held, 1996, p. 119). In other words, the "theory
of representative liberal democracy fundamentally shifted the terms
of reference of democratic thought" (Held, 1996, p. 119). In 1820,
James Mill (father of John Stuart Mill) claims that the institution
of representative government is "the grand discovery of modern
times" in which "the solution of all difficulties, both speculative
and practical, would be found" (quoted in Held, 1996, p. 119).
James
Madison, one of the key architects of the American constitution, regards
the system of representation as a cure for the problem of faction. By
a faction, Madison means "a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community" (Federalist Papers, No. 10). Obviously, it would not
be a problem if the faction forms only a minority of the political community
because the democratic procedure of equal voting will allow the majority
to defeat the "sinister views" of the faction. A problem arises,
however, if there is a majority faction. In this case, the very form
of popular government will enable the majority faction to "sacrifice
to its ruling passions or interests both the public good and the rights
of other citizens." This problem is generally referred to as the
"tyranny of the majority."
To solve
the problem of majority tyranny, Madison continues, a particular set
of constitutional arrangements, among which are the system of representative
government and a large electorate, are needed. One advantage of the
system of representation is that it provides a mechanism "to refine
and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under
such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced
by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for
the purpose" (Federalist Papers, No. 10).
The system
of representation, however, could produce its own problems. The class
of representatives itself can become an entrenched faction and work
against the public interest. To solve this problem, Madison offers a
novel solution (contrary to the traditional understanding of democracy):
a large electorate body. A large republic, in contrast to a small one,
has several advantages. First, in a large country, it is easier to find
fit characters to become representatives for public administration because
there are more potential candidates, but "the number of representatives
in the two cases [is] not in proportion to that of the two constituents,
and [is] proportionally greater in the small republic." Second,
"as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens
in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for
unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which
elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being
more free, will be more likely to center in men who possess the most
attractive merit and the most diffusive and established character."
If James Madison is mainly concerned with the problem of faction, John
Stuart Mill, writing in England two generations later, is definitely
more worried about the inexperience and instability of the general electorate.
In "Considerations on Representative Government," Mill, who
"largely set the course of modern liberal democratic thought"
(Held, 1996, p. 100), sees representative democracy as the only desirable
system to accommodate the need for professionalism and expertise in
administration, on the one hand, and public accountability on the other.
To Mill, the ancient Greek ideal of direct democracy is pure folly for
modern nation states, whose sheer size makes it impossible for a meaningful
number of people to participate directly in the day-to-day administration
of the state. The institution of representative government, together
with the right to free speech, free press and popularly elected assembly,
has distinct advantages: it provides popular control of the government
without sacrificing the professionalism and leadership qualities that
an effective government requires.
There
is a "radical distinction," according to Mill, "between
controlling the business of government and actually doing it" (Mill,
1951, pp. 229-30). In a democracy, the general electorate have the ultimate
check on the business of the government. However, this does not imply
that the demos should actually run the government. The actual running
of the government should bedone by professionals with the necessary
knowledge and skills. If the general public does not get involved in
the details of the governmental administration, not only will efficiency
increase, the actual decisions made also tend to be better. Importantly,
and fortunately, the justifications for democracy do not require that
the business of the government be conducted directly by the general
electorate. One key justification for democracy, says Mill, is that
it provides a prime mechanism for moral self-development and the "highest
and harmonious" expansion of individual capacities. This justification
can be fulfilled during the election process when the general public
chooses their representatives in the government. When the general electorate
becomes involved in the business of running the government, the benefits
of any self-development are far outweighed by the costs of inefficiency,
confusion, and diffusion of responsibilities.
To be
sure, John Stuart Mill does not have much faith in the judgment of the
electorate and the elected. Although Mill champions a plural system
of election, regrettably he also proposes unequal voting rights: more
votes, according to Mill, should be allocated to those wiser and more
talented. Mill's distrust in the general public's judgment and sentiment
is one important reason leading him to propose a representative form
of government in which important public decisions are made by qualified
leaders with knowledge, expertise and wisdom.
By the
early 20th century, the idea of representative government had become
a self-evident truth for most students of democracy. For Joseph Schumpeter,
for example, it is impossible for an empirically minded observer to
define democracy without reference to a representative system of government.
In fact, Schumpeter goes even further. In his classic "Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy," Schumpeter defines "the democratic
method" as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269).
Schumpeter then goes on to criticize the classical understanding of
democracy: "[D]emocracy does not mean and cannot mean that the
people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms 'people' and
'rule.' Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of
accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them. But since they might
decide this also in entirely undemocratic ways, we have had to narrow
our definition by adding a further criterion identifying the democratic
method, viz., free competition among would-be leaders for the vote of
the electorate." From this definition of democracy, we see clearly
that in the mind of Schumpeter there is no way to organize democracy
other than by having a representative system.
What is
the historical significance of the theory of representative government?
Clearly, as Professor Dahl and Professor Held have observed, the theory
of representative liberal democracy brought democratic thought to a
completely new stage: democracy is no longer thought to be applicable
only to small city-states. In fact, according to Professor Dahl, this
new stage marked the second major transformation in political life.
Professor Dahl regards the shift from the "rule by the few"
to the "rule by the many" in ancient Greece and Rome as the
first major transformation in the political history of human society.
The locus of the first democratic transformation was in the city-states.
In contrast, the mark of the second democratic transformation is the
shift of the locus of political life from small city-states to large
national states. One key intellectual and institutional innovation that
enabled this shift is the theory and practice of representative democracy.
In addition, with the introduction of representative government, the
traditional understanding of democracy as direct popular participation
in the ruling of a country became obsolete. The ancient sovereign assembly
was replaced by a highly complex system of government. In fact, the
"institutions of representative democracy removed government so
far from the direct reach of the demos that one could reasonably wonder,
as some critics have, whether the new system was entitled to call itself
by the venerable name of democracy" (Dahl, 1989, p. 30).
Obviously,
the separation between "controlling the government" and "running
the government" creates its own problems, one of which is the danger
of creating an entrenched class of social and political elites that
can easily abuse its power and self-serve. To solve this problem, representative
democracy needs liberalism: a set of liberal institutions to ensure
that there is real political competition, free speech and free press.
If the system of representative government, unchecked and unbalanced,
tends to result in concentration of power, liberalism then works to
the opposite: liberal institutions, including a constitutional state
and a system of checks and balances, disperse political power across
various interest groups and throughout the society. "Where in the
older view factionalism and conflict were believed to be destructive,
political conflict came to be regarded as a normal, inevitable, even
desirable part of a democratic order. Consequently the ancient belief
that citizens both could and should pursue the public good rather than
their private ends became more difficult to sustain, and even impossible,
as 'the public good' fragmented into individual and group interests"
(Dahl, 1989, p. 30). In addition, in order to prevent the formation
of an entrenched class of self-serving elites, representative democracy
also needs to create an array of egalitarian institutions to ensure,
to the extent justifiable, equal start for all, equal opportunity for
all, and a high degree of social mobility.
Another
potential problem of representative democracy is the detachment and
alienation felt by many "small" people because there seems
to be no way for them to influence public policy. Here, again, representative
democracy needs liberal institutions: autonomous associations, civil
society, and ample room for political mobilization and individual participation.
"[T]he older idea of monistic democracy, in which autonomous political
associations were thought to be unnecessary and illegitimate, was transformed
into a pluralist political system in which autonomous associations were
held to be not only legitimate but actually necessary to democracy on
a large scale" (Dahl, 1989, p. 30). We will discuss the relationship
between liberalism and democracy in later parts of this series.
In summary,
the theory and practice of representative government transformed the
way in which democracy is understood and organized. Representative government
enabled a shift of the democratic stage from small city-states to large
nation-states, and it has been viewed by many as a desirable solution
to the competing needs of an effective but also accountable government.
The emergence of representative democracy also called for a whole set
of liberal institutions to make democracy work better. This last point
probably explains the historical coincidence of the appearance of representative
democracy and the intellectual birth of liberalism.
(The author Bo Li is an associate at the New York law firm of Davis
Polk & Wardwell.)
1.
Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critiques. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989.
2. Held, David. Models of Democracy (2nd Edition). Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1996.
3. Madison, James. The Federalist Papers, No. 10. London: Everyman,
1996.
4. Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. In
Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton.
London: Dent, 1951.
5. Rousseau, J. J. The Social Contract. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.
6. Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York:
Harper & Row, 1976.