Defense
Against a Charge of Subverting the Democracy (XXV)
I can find
full excuse for you, gentlemen of the jury, if on hearing such statements
and remembering past events you are equally incensed against all those
who remained in the city. But I am surprised at my accusers: they neglect
their own concerns to attend to those of others, and now, though they
know for certain who are guilty of nothing and who have committed many
offences, they seek to persuade you into holding this same opinion about
us all.
Now, if
they conceive that they have charged me with everything that the city
has suffered at the hands of the Thirty, I consider them to be speakers
of no ability; for they have not mentioned so much as a small fraction
of what has been perpetrated by those men. But if their statements imply
that I had any connection with those things, I shall prove that their
words are nothing but lies, and that on my part I behaved as the best
citizen in the Peiraeus would have done, if he had remained in the city.
I beg you,
gentlemen, not to share the views of the slander-mongers. Their business
is to inculpate even those who have committed no offence, --for it is
out of them especially that they would make money,1 --while yours is
to allow an equal enjoyment of civic rights to those who have done no
wrong; for in this way you will secure to the established constitution
the greatest number of allies.
And I claim,
gentlemen, if I am found to have been the cause of none of our disasters,
but rather to have performed many services to the State with both my
person and my purse, that at any rate I should have that support from
you which is the just desert, not merely of those who have served you
well, but also of those who have done you no wrong.
Now, I
consider that I have a strong justification in the fact that, if my
accusers were able to convict me of wrongdoing in private life, they
would not charge me with the misdeeds of the Thirty: they would not
see occasion to traduce others on the score of what those persons have
perpetrated, but only to requite the actual wrongdoers. But in fact
they conceive that your resentment against those men is sufficient to
involve in their ruin those who have done no harm at all.
I, however,
hold that, just as it would be unfair, when some men have been the source
of many benefits to the city, to let others carry off the reward of
your honors or your thanks, so it is unreasonable, when some have continually
done you harm, that their acts should bring reproach and slander upon
those who have done no wrong. The city has enough enemies already existing,
who count it a great gain to have people brought up on slanderous charges.
I will
now try to explain to you who of the citizens are inclined, in my view,
to court oligarchy, and who democracy. This will serve as a basis both
for your decision and for the defence that I shall offer for myself;
for I shall make it evident that neither under the democracy nor under
the oligarchy has my conduct suggested any inclination to be disloyal
to your people.
Now, first
of all, you should reflect that no human being is naturally either an
oligarch or a democrat: whatever constitution a man finds advantageous
to himself, he is eager to see that one established; so it largely depends
on you whether the present system finds an abundance of supporters.
That this is the truth, you will have no difficulty in deducing from
the events of the past.
For consider,
gentlemen of the jury, how many times the leaders of both governments1
changed sides. Did not Phrynichus, Peisander and their fellow demagogues,
when they had committed many offences against you, proceed, in fear
of the requital that they deserved, to establish the first oligarchy?
And did not many of the Four Hundred, again, join in the return of the
Peiraeus party, while some, on the other hand, who had helped in the
expulsion of the Four Hundred, actually appeared among the Thirty? Some,
too, of those who had enlisted for Eleusis marched out with you to besiege
their own comrades!
There is
thus no difficulty in concluding, gentlemen, that the questions dividing
men are concerned, not with politics, but with their personal advantage.
You should therefore apply this test in the probation of your citizens:
examine their use of the citizenship under the democracy, and inquire
whether they stood to benefit by a change in the government. In this
way you will most justly form your decision upon them.
Now, in
my opinion, all those who had been disfranchised under the democracy,
or deprived of their property, or subjected to any other misfortune
of the sort, were bound to desire a different system, in the hope that
the change would be some benefit to themselves. But in the case of those
who have done the people many good services, and never a single hurt,
and who deserve your grateful favors instead of punishment for what
they have achieved, it is not fair to harbor the slanders aimed at them,
not even if all who have charge of public affairs allege that they favor
oligarchy.
Now I,
gentlemen of the jury, never suffered any misfortune during that time,1
either private or public, which could lead me, through eagerness to
be relieved of present ills, to court a change in our system. I have
equipped a warship five times, fought in four sea-battles, contributed
to many war levies, and performed my other public services as amply
as any citizen.
But my
purpose in spending more than was enjoined upon me by the city was to
raise myself the higher in your opinion, so that if any misfortune should
chance to befall me I might defend myself on better terms. Of all this
credit I was deprived under the oligarchy; for instead of regarding
those who had bestowed some benefit on the people as worthy recipients
of their favors, they placed in positions of honor the men who had done
you most harm, as though this were a pledge by which they held us bound.
You ought all to reflect on those facts and refuse to believe the statements
of these men: you should rather judge each person by the record of his
actions.
For I,
gentlemen, was not one of the Four Hundred: I challenge anyone who wishes
amongst my accusers to come forward and convict me of this. Neither,
again, will anyone prove that, when the Thirty were established, I sat
on the Council or held any office. Surely, if I chose not to hold office
when I could have done so, I deserve to be honored by you today. If,
on their part, the men who were in power at that time preferred not
to give me a place in the government, could I find a more signal proof
than this of the falsehood of my accusers?
Furthermore,
gentlemen of the jury, you ought also to take account of the rest of
my conduct. For amid the misfortunes of the city my behavior was such
that, if everyone had been of one mind with me, not one of you would
have experience of a single misfortune. I had no hand during the oligarchy,
you will find, either in the arrest of anybody, or in taking vengeance
upon any of my enemies, or in conferring a favor on any of my friends,
--and in that there is nothing to wonder at, for at that time it was
difficult to confer favors, though an act of mischief was easy for anyone
who wished. Again, you will find that I did not place the name of a
single Athenian on the black list,1 or obtain a decree of arbitration
against anyone, or enrich myself by means of your misfortunes. Yet surely,
if you are incensed against the authors of your past troubles, it is
reasonable that those who have done no mischief should stand the higher
in your opinion.
And indeed,
gentlemen of the jury, I consider that I have given the democracy the
strongest pledge of my attachment. For if I did no mischief at that
time, when ample licence for it was allowed, surely I shall now make
every effort to be a good citizen in the full knowledge that, if I am
guilty of wrong, I shall incur immediate punishment. But in fact I have
continually held to this resolve, --under an oligarchy, not to covet
the property of others, and under a democracy, to spend my own upon
you with zeal.
I consider,
gentlemen, that you would not be justified in hating those who have
suffered nothing under the oligarchy, when you can indulge your wrath
against those who have done your people mischief; or in regarding as
enemies those who did not go into exile instead of those who expelled
you, or those who were anxious to save their own property instead of
those who stripped others of theirs, or those who stayed in the city
with a view to their own safety instead of those who took part in the
government for the purpose of destroying others. If you think it your
duty to destroy the men whom they passed over, not one of the citizens
will be left to us.
You ought
also to take account of this further point, gentlemen of the jury: you
are all aware that under the previous democracy there were many in the
ministry who robbed the Treasury; while some accepted bribes at your
expense, and others by malicious informations estranged your allies.1
Now, if the Thirty had kept their punishments for these cases, you would
have held them yourselves to be honest men: but when in fact you found
them deliberately oppressing the people because of the offences of those
persons, you were indignant; for you considered it monstrous that the
crimes of the few should be spread over the whole city.
It is not
right, therefore, that you should resort to those offences which you
saw them committing, or regard those deeds, which you deemed unjust
when done to you, as just when you do them to others. No: let your feeling
towards us after your restoration be the same as you had towards yourselves
in your exile; for by this means you will produce the utmost harmony
amongst us, the power of the city will be at its highest, and you will
vote for what will be most distressing to your enemies.
And you
should reflect, gentlemen, on the events that have occurred under the
Thirty, in order that the errors of your enemies may lead you to take
better counsel on your own affairs. For as often as you heard that the
people in the city were all of one mind, you had but slight hopes of
your return, judging that our concord was the worst of signs for your
exile: but as soon as you had tidings that the Three Thousand were divided
by faction, that the rest of the citizens had been publicly banned from
the city, that the Thirty were not all of one mind, and that those who
had fears for you outnumbered those who were making war on you, you
immediately began to look forward to your return and the punishment
of your enemies. For it was your prayer to the gods that those men should
do the things that you saw them doing, since you believed that the villainy
of the Thirty would be far more useful for your salvation than the resources
of the exiles for your return.
You ought
therefore, gentlemen, to take the events of the past as your example
in resolving on the future course of things, and to account those men
the best democrats who, desiring your concord, abide by their oaths
and covenants, because they hold this to be the most effective safeguard
of the city and the severest punishment of her enemies. For nothing
could be more vexatious to them than to learn that we are taking part
in the government and to perceive at the same time that the citizens
are behaving as though they had never had any fault to find with each
other.
And you
should know, gentlemen, that the exiles desire to see the greatest possible
number of their fellow citizens not merely slandered but disfranchised;
since they hope that the men who are wronged by you will be their allies,
and they would gladly have the venal informers standing high in your
esteem and influential in the city. For they judge the villainy of those
creatures to be their own safeguard.
You will
do well to remember also the events that followed the rule of the Four
Hundred; for you will fully realize that the measures advised by these
men have never brought you any advantage, while those that I recommend
have always profited both parties in the State. You know that Epigenes,
Demophanes and Cleisthenes, while reaping their personal gains from
the city's misfortunes, have inflicted the heaviest losses on the public
weal.
For they
prevailed on you to condemn several men to death without trial, to confiscate
unjustly the property of many more, and to banish and disfranchise other
citizens; since they were capable of taking money for the release of
offenders, and of appearing before you to effect the ruin of the innocent.
They did not stop until they had involved the city in seditions and
the gravest disasters, while raising themselves from poverty to wealth.
But your
temper moved you to welcome back the exiles, to reinstate the disfranchised
in their rights, and to bind yourselves by oaths to concord with the
rest. At the end of it all, you would have been more pleased to punish
those who traded in slander under the democracy than those who held
office under the oligarchy. And with good reason, gentlemen: for it
is manifest now to all that the unjust acts of rulers in an oligarchy
produce democracy, whereas the trade of slanderers in the democracy
has twice led to the establishment of oligarchy. It is not right, therefore,
to hearken many times to the counsels of men whose advice has not even
once resulted in your profit.
And you
should consider that, in the Peiraeus party, those who are in highest
repute, who have run the greatest risk, and who have rendered you the
most services, had often before exhorted your people to abide by their
oaths and covenants, since they held this to be the bulwark of democracy:
for they felt that it would give the party of the town immunity from
the consequences of the past,1 and the party of the Peiraeus an assurance
of the most lasting permanence of the constitution.
For these
are the men whom you would be far more justified in trusting than those
who, as exiles, owed their deliverance to others and, now that they
have returned, are taking up the slanderer's trade. In my opinion, gentlemen
of the jury, those among our people remaining in the city who shared
my views have clearly proved, both under oligarchy and under democracy,
what manner of citizens they are.
But the
men who give us good cause to wonder what they would have done if they
had been allowed to join the Thirty are the men who now, in a democracy,
imitate those rulers; who have made a rapid advance from poverty to
wealth, and who hold a number of offices without rendering an account
of any; who instead of concord have created mutual suspicion, and who
have declared war instead of peace; and who have caused us to be distrusted
by the Greeks.
Authors
of all these troubles and of many more besides, and differing no whit
from the Thirty, --save that the latter pursued the same ends as theirs
during an oligarchy, while these men follow their example in a democracy,
--they yet make it their business to maltreat in this light fashion
any person they may wish, as though everyone else were guilty, and they
had proved themselves men of the highest virtue.
(Nay, it
is not so much they who give cause for wonder as you, who suppose that
there is a democracy, whereas things are done just as they please, and
punishment falls, not on those who have injured your people, but on
those who refuse to yield their own possessions. ) And they would sooner
have the city diminished than raised to greatness and freedom by others:
they consider that their perils in the Peiraeus give them licence now
to do just as they please, while, if later on you obtain deliverance
through others, they themselves will be swept away, and those others
will be advanced in power. So they combine to obstruct any efforts that
others may make for your benefit.
But their
purpose is readily detected by any observer: for they are not anxious
to hide themselves, but are rather ashamed not to be reputed villains;
while you partly see the mischief for yourselves, and partly hear it
from many other persons. As for us, gentlemen, we consider that you
are bound by your duty towards all the citizens to abide by your covenants
and your oaths: nevertheless, when we see justice done upon the authors
of your troubles, we remember your former experiences, and condone you;
but when you show yourselves openly chastising the innocent along with
the guilty, by the same vote you will be involving us all in suspicion.
...
Against
The Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution (XXXIV)
At the
very moment when we were supposing, men of Athens, that the disasters
that have befallen her have left behind them sufficient reminders to
the city to prevent even our descendants from desiring a change of constitution,
these men are seeking to deceive us, after our grievous sufferings and
our experience of both systems, with the selfsame decrees with which
they have tricked us twice before.
It is not
at them that I wonder, but at you who listen to them, for being the
most forgetful of mankind, or the readiest to suffer injury from such
men as these; who shared by mere chance in the operations at the Peiraeus,
but whose feelings were with the party of the town. What, I ask, was
the object of returning from your exile, if by your votes you are to
enslave yourselves?
Now I,
men of Athens, am not debarred on account either of means or of birth,
but in both respects have the advantage of my opponents; and I consider
that the only deliverance for the city is to let all Athenians share
the citizenship. For when we possessed our walls, our ships, and money
and allies, far from proposing to exclude any Athenian, we actually
granted the right of marriage to the Euboeans.1 Shall we debar today
even our existing citizens?
No, if
you will be advised by me; nor, after losing our walls, shall we denude
ourselves of our forces,--large numbers of our infantry, our cavalry
and our archers: for, if you hold fast to these, you will make your
democracy secure, will be more victorious over your enemies, and will
be more useful to your allies. You are well aware that in the previous
oligarchies of our time it was not the possessors of land who controlled
the city: many of them were put to death, and many were expelled from
the city; and the people, after recalling them, restored your city to
you, but did not venture to participate in it themselves. Thus, if you
take my advice, you will not be depriving your benefactors, so far as
you may, of their native land, nor be placing more confidence in words
than in deeds, in the future than in the past, especially if you remember
the champions of oligarchy, who in speech make war on the people, but
in fact are aiming at your property; and this they will acquire when
they find you destitute of allies.
And then
they ask us, when such is our plight, what deliverance there can be
for the city, unless we do as the Lacedaemonians demand. But I call
upon them to tell us what profit will accrue to the people if we obey
their orders. If we do not, it will be far nobler to die fighting than
to pass a manifest sentence of death upon ourselves.
For I believe
that if I can persuade you, the danger will be common to both sides...
And I observe
the same attitude in both the Argives and the Mantineans, each inhabiting
their own land,--the former bordering on the Lacedaemonians, the latter
dwelling near them; in the one case, their number is no greater than
ours, in the other it is less than three thousand.
For their
enemies know that, often as they may invade the territories of these
peoples, as often will they march out to oppose them under arms, so
that they see no glory in the venture: if they should be victorious,
they could not enslave them, and if they should be defeated, they must
deprive themselves of the advantages that they already possess. The
more they prosper, the less is their appetite for risk.
We also,
men of Athens, held these views, when we had command over the Greeks;
and we deemed it a wise course to suffer our land to be ravaged without
feeling obliged to fight in its defence. For our interest lay in neglecting
a few things in order to conserve many advantages. But today, when the
fortune of battle has deprived us of all these, and our native land
is all that is left to us, we know that only this venture holds out
hopes of our deliverance.
But surely
we ought to remember that heretofore, when we have gone to the support
of others who were victims of injury, we have set up many a trophy over
our foes on alien soil, and so ought now to act as valiant defenders
of our country and of ourselves: let us trust in the gods, and hope
that they will stand for justice on the side of the injured.
Strange
indeed would it be, men of Athens, if after fighting the Lacedaemonians,
in the time of our exile, to achieve our return, we should take to flight,
when we have returned, to avoid fighting! And will it not be shameful
if we sink to such a depth of baseness that, whereas our ancestors risked
their all merely for the freedom of their neighbors, you do not dare
even to make war for your own?...
Strange
indeed would it be, men of Athens, if after fighting the Lacedaemonians,
in the time of our exile, to achieve our return, we should take to flight,
when we have returned, to avoid fighting! And will it not be shameful
if we sink to such a depth of baseness that, whereas our ancestors risked
their all merely for the freedom of their neighbors, you do not dare
even to make war for your own?...