Off
the coast of Malta in a Soviet ship named the Maxim Gorky, U.S. President
George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met within weeks of
the fall of the Berlin Wall to discuss the rapid changes in Europe.
Bush expressed support for perestroika and other reforms in the Eastern
bloc, and both men recognized the lessening of tensions that had defined
the Cold War.
No
agreements were signed at the summit, but to some it marked the end
of the Cold War. Following are excerpted transcripts of conversations
between Bush and Gorbachev on December 2-3, 1989. The transcript from
the second day of talks includes remarks by Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and U.S. National
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.
December
2, 1989
George
Bush: ... Since the idea of this summit was proposed many important
events have been taking place in the international arena. I assume that
during the forthcoming exchange we will be able to share our views of
these changes, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in other regions,
in order to improve our mutual understanding of where we stand. I am
in favor of not only an exchange in the presence of our delegations,
but only on eye-to-eye basis. I believe we should meet more often.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: I agree. I have a feeling that we have already talked, and
this meeting is the continuation of our useful conversations.
George
Bush: Precisely. ... Concerning our attitude toward perestroika. I would
like to say as clearly as possible that I agree completely with what
you said in New York: The world would be better if perestroika succeeds.
Not long ago there was considerable doubt about this in the United States.
Back in New York [in December 1988] you said there were elements that
did not wish for the success of perestroika. I cannot say that there
are no such elements in the United States. But I can definitively say
that serious, thinking people in the United States do not share such
opinions. These shifts in public mood in the United States are affected
by the changes in Eastern Europe, the whole process of perestroika.
... I would like now to lay out a number of positive initiatives that,
in our opinion, could in general outline directions for our joint work
to prepare an official summit in the United States. [...]
[Bush also
touched on regional issues, including the position of the United States
with regard to the situation in Central America. Then he proposed to
discuss the issues of disarmament.]
George
Bush: We would like to inquire if it is possible for the Soviet Union
to publish roughly the same amount of data on the Soviet military budget
as we do in the United States. I believe that our publications give
a rather comprehensive impression about what kind of military activities
are undertaken in our country. I am sure that your intelligence services
can confirm this authoritatively.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: They report to me, on the contrary, that you do not publish
everything.
George
Bush: I am convinced that the publication of more detailed data on military
budgets, on a mutual basis, would encourage trust in this sphere. [...]
Mikhail
Gorbachev: ... I would like to share with you some of my thoughts of
a philosophical nature. I believe it is important for us both to discuss
which lessons should be drawn from past experience, from the Cold War.
...
Not everything
that has taken place should be considered in a negative light. For 45
years we have been managing to avoid a big war. This single fact alone
says that not everything was bad in the past. Nevertheless, one conclusion
is obvious -- the reliance on force, on military superiority and the
arms race that stemmed from it, did not withstand the test. And our
two countries seem to realize it better than anyone else. To no avail
was the ideological confrontation which kept us busy maligning each
other. We reached a dangerous brink. And it is good that we managed
to stop. It is good that mutual trust emerged between our two countries.
...
Cold War
methods, methods of confrontation suffered a strategic defeat. We have
come to this realization. And common people have realized this, perhaps
even better. I do not want to preach here. People simply interfere into
policy making. Ecological problems, problems of preservation of natural
resources, problems with regard to bad consequences of technological
progress. And all this is understandable, essentially this is a question
of survival. And this kind of public mood is strongly affecting us,
politicians.
Therefore,
we together -- the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. -- can do a lot on this stage
to change radically our old approaches. We had already felt it in our
contacts with the Reagan administration. And this process continues
today. Look how we opened ourselves to each other. ...
But in
both countries there are people -- and quite a few of them -- who simply
scare us. ... Why do I mention this? From American political circles
one hears a thesis: the Soviet Union has begun its perestroika, has
been changing its line under the pressure of the Cold War policy [of
the United States]. They say that everything is crumbling in Eastern
Europe and that this proves that those who had relied on Cold War methods
were right. And if so, nothing should be changed in this policy. One
should increase pressure and prepare more baskets to collect fruits.
Mr. President, this is a dangerous illusion. [...]
You considered
the question: what kind of Soviet Union is in the U.S. interest -- the
dynamic, stable, solid one or the one struggling with all kinds of problems.
I am informed about the advice you have been receiving. ...
George
Bush: I hope you noticed that while the changes in Eastern Europe have
been going on, the United States has not engaged in condescending declarations
aimed at damaging the Soviet Union. There are people in the United States
who accuse me of being too cautious. It is true I am a prudent man,
but I am not a coward, and my administration will seek to avoid doing
anything that would damage your position in the world. But I was insistently
advised to do something of that sort -- to climb the Berlin Wall and
to make broad declarations. My administration, however, is avoiding
these steps, we are in favor of reserved behavior.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: I welcome your words. I regard them as a manifestation of
political will. It is important for me. ...
Now on
Central America. ... I want to emphasize again: we pursue no goals in
Central America. We do not want to gain bridgeheads, strong-points,
you should be certain of this.
December 3, 1989
Mikhail
Gorbachev: I reaffirmed our principle position regarding the U.S. role
in Europe on purpose. There are too many speculations on this issue.
They are fed to you, and to us. We should be absolutely clear on such
important matters. Now about the changes in Europe. They really are
of fundamental character. And not only in Eastern Europe -- in Western
Europe too. I received the representatives of the Trilateral Commission.
After one of our conversations, Giscard d'Estaing, who was the speaker,
addressed me, and said in a very meaningful way: "Be ready to deal
with a united federal state of Western Europe." By saying that,
I think, he meant that when the European integration reaches the qualitatively
new level in 1992, that would be accompanied by a deep restructuring
of the political structures, which would also reach a stage of federation.
Therefore,
all Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of something
new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, as we associate the idea
of the common European home with this movement. I would like to ask
E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker to discuss the idea in
depth, because, I think, it is in the interests of both the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S. We should act -- and interact -- in a more responsible
and balanced way in this period when entire Europe is undergoing such
dynamic changes.
George
Bush: I agree with you. [...]
That is
what I was telling Primakov. He said that he came to learn from the
U.S. Congress. And I said to him: "Leave that idea alone."
If you want to build a new system that really works, do not look at
our relations with Congress as a model. In general the system is not
bad, but sometimes, I am close to desperation.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: That is right. Foreign experience should be studied, but
we should only adopt something from it if it fits our context. [...]
There are
two realities in Afghanistan -- the opposition and Najibullah. Let us
help them interact. And what they agree on -- is their business. The
Soviet Union will accept any decision. Najibullah is ready for such
an open dialogue, and we should not issue ultimatums, or demand his
departure. Who will take him out? Do you want us to introduce our troops
there again?
James Baker:
Stop your massive assistance to Kabul.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: Let us stop these empty conversations. Stop thinking that
you know everything. You predicted Najibullah's collapse after the withdrawal
of Soviet troops many times. They have such a complex situation there
that no simple solution will do.
George
Bush: To tell the truth, I am surprised to hear that the tribal leaders
are already for talks with Najibullah.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: Not just ready, they are already talking to him one by one.
You can ask Hekmatyar, for example.
George
Bush: We are not in contact with him.
Eduard
Shevardnadze: But the CIA is.
Brent Scowcroft:
We are not trying to prevent the Mujahadeen from contacts with Najibullah.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: We also probably know only about a small part of these contacts.
The East is the East.
George
Bush: I completely agree with you.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: Let our ministers continue this useful conversation.
James Baker:
We need the Mujahedeen's agreement to the idea of a "transition
period." Before, the opposition did not want any contacts with
Najibullah. Now they are sending us signals that they are ready to begin
talks about a transition period with Najibullah at the table. But that
is on one condition -- that there would be an understanding from the
very beginning, that at the end of the transition period Najibullah
would step down, and a new government would be formed. Here, a United
Nations participation could be helpful, including holding an international
conference. These are the precise positions from which the American
delegation spoke in Wyoming.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: We can discuss your ideas.
James Baker:
If the Mujahadeen agree, then the next government could include PDPA
elements, but only if we have a clear understanding that there would
be no Najibullah or his close supporters in it.
Eduard
Shevardnadze: Let them decide it on their own.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: The dialogue will clarify this issue. The idea of a transition
period in itself is reasonable, because it allows the two realities
to interact. If the Afghans themselves decide that Najibullah has to
go -- let it be so. It is their business. Nobody imposes this on them.
George
Bush: That would be good.
James Baker:
But the Mujahadeen will simply not sit at the negotiating table if they
do not know that at the end of the transition period there will be a
new head of government in Afghanistan.
Mikhail
Gorbachev: And who could give them such a guarantee? If they are so
confident that their positions are strong, why would they worry?
James Baker:
There is a new element that appeared recently. The opposition at last
is ready to talk to Najibullah about the conditions of forming the new
government. But they have to be sure that in the end Najibullah would
step down in the interest of peace. [...]