I
| II | III
| IV | V
| VI | VII
| VIII
Book One
Part I
Every state
is a community of some kind, and every community is established with
a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that
which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the
state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which
embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other,
and at the highest good.
Some people
think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and
master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in
the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called
a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger
number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between
a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between
the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal,
the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political science,
the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all
this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident
to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has
hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics,
the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least
parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which
the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different
kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result
can be attained about each one of them.
Part II
He who
thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state
or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first
place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other;
namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is
a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in
common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire
to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and
subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the
exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that
which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject,
and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest.
Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she
is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for
many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument
is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because
there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves,
male and female. Wherefore the poets say,
"It
is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; "
as if they
thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of
these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the
first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says,
"First
house and wife and an ox for the plough, "
for the
ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established
by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of
it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides
the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when several families are
united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of
daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the
most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from
the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said
to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic
states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were
under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still
are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies
of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were
of the same blood. As Homer says:
"Each
one gives law to his children and to his wives. "
For they
lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men
say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or
were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not
only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their
own.
When several
villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to
be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating
in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake
of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural,
so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing
is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its
nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides,
the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing
is the end and the best.
Hence it
is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by
nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident
is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like
the
"Tribeless,
lawless, hearthless one, "
whom Homer
denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be
compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that
man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious
animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain,
and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech.
And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and
is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the
perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another,
and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient
and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And
it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and
evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living
beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further,
the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual,
since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the
whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an
equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed
the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their
working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when
they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the
same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior
to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing;
and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who
is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient
for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.
A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who
first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when
perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and
justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous,
and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence
and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have
not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and
the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in
states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination
of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Part III
Seeing
then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the
state we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of
household management correspond to the persons who compose the household,
and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should
begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the
first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband
and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each
of these three relations is and ought to be: I mean the relation of
master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and
wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative relation
(this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a household,
the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical
with household management, according to others, a principal part of
it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.
Let us
first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life
and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than
exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master
is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership
of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the
outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over
slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave
and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference
with nature is therefore unjust.
Part IV
Property
is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part
of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed
live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts
which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper
instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management
of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living,
others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless,
in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant
is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for
maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave
is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and
the servant is himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other
instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish its own work,
obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus,
or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet,
"of
their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods; "
if, in
like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre
without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants,
nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be drawn;
the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst
a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is
not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment
or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action
are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments
which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and
not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again,
a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not
only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is
also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave;
he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of
his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature
and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's
man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who,
being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined
as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.
Part V
But is
there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such
a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation
of nature?
There is
no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason
and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing
not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some
are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there
are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better
which is exercised over better subjects- for example, to rule over men
is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which
is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is
ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form
a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous
or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element
comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in
them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in
things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical
mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict
ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists
of soul and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler,
and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions
of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which
are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most
perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true
relation of the two; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will
often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and
unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living
creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul
rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the
appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that
the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational
element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality
of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds
good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature
than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by
man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior,
and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled;
this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then
there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between
men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their
body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves,
and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under
the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's
and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but
not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower
animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts.
And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different;
for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would
like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making
the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and although useless
for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war
and peace. But the opposite often happens- that some have the souls
and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed
from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues
of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class
should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how
much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul?
but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is
not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others
slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.
Part VI
But that
those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their
side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in
two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature.
The law of which I speak is a sort of convention- the law by which whatever
is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right
many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an
unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because one man
has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another
shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference
of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the views invade
each other's territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue, when furnished
with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force; and
as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of
some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply
one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with
goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger).
If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no
force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought
to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a
principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume
that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law,
but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the
war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is
unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank
would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents
chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not
like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet,
in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we
spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere,
others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard
themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but
they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that
there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other
relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:
"Who
would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the
stem of the Gods? "
What does
this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery, noble and humble
birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men
and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs.
But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.
We see
then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and
that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also
that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two classes,
rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the others
to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others exercising the
authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse
of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and
whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the
master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where
the relation of master and slave between them is natural they are friends
and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force
the reverse is true.
Part VII
The previous
remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a
constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not,
as some affirm, the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised
over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are
by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house
is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen
and equals. The master is not called a master because he has science,
but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies
to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master
and science for the slave. The science of the slave would be such as
the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing slaves in
their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further,
so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some duties are
of the more necessary, others of the more honorable sort; as the proverb
says, 'slave before slave, master before master.' But all such branches
of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of the master,
which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned,
not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-called
science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only
know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. Hence
those who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards
who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy
or with politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly
acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the art
of the slave, being a species of hunting or war. Enough of the distinction
between master and slave.
Part VIII
Let us
now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting wealth,
in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown to be
a part of property. The first question is whether the art of getting
wealth is the same with the art of managing a household or a part of
it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that
the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or
in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of
the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the
one provides tools and the other material; and by material I mean the
substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is the material
of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the
art of household management is not identical with the art of getting
wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides. For
the art which uses household stores can be no other than the art of
household management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art of
getting wealth is a part of household management or a distinct art.
If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth and property can
be procured, but there are many sorts of property and riches, then are
husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general, parts of the
wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of
food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of animals and
men; they must all have food, and the differences in their food have
made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious,
others are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted to sustain
them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous:
and their habits are determined for them by nature in such a manner
that they may obtain with greater facility the food of their choice.
But, as different species have different tastes, the same things are
not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous
or herbivorous animals further differ among themselves. In the lives
of men too there is a great difference. The laziest are shepherds, who
lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from tame
animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search
of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of
living farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different
kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes
or marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen,
and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater
number obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such
are the modes of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry
springs up of itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and
retail trade- there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the
fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two
employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus
the life of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life
of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly
combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in
the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself
to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For
some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much food
as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous
or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have
up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves,
which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth
of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals
exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not
all at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision
of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete,
and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals
for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is
a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting,
an art which we ought to practice against wild beasts, and against men
who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for
war of such a kind is naturally just.
Of the
art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part
of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household
management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things
necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state,
as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount
of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although
Solon in one of his poems says that
"No
bound to riches has been fixed for man. "
But there
is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the instruments
of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches
may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household
or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition
which is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and what
is the reason of this.
Part IX
There is
another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly
called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion
that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with
the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not
very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described
is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art.
Let us
begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:
Of everything
which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the thing as such,
but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the
improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear,
and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a
shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed
use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose,
for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said
of all possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them,
and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that
some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail
trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been
so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first
community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no
use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the
members of the family originally had all things in common; later, when
the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and
different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange
for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practiced among
barbarous nations who exchange with one another the necessaries of life
and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange
for coin, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting
art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction
of men's natural wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew,
as might have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants
of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported
what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily
came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried
about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other
something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the
purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the
value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process
of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and
to mark the value.
When the
use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of necessary
articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail trade;
which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated
as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the
greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of coin, the art
of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with
it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; having to consider
how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed by many to be
only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail
trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is
a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if
the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and
because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life,
and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary
food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance
and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable
prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?
Hence men
seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth
than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural riches
and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; in their
true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail
trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange.
And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of
exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the
riches which spring from this art of wealth getting. As in the art of
medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other
arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they
aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there
is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of
wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the
spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting
which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit;
the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore,
in one point of view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as
a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all getters
of wealth increase their hoard of coin without limit. The source of
the confusion is the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting;
in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is different,
and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property,
but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but
there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe
that getting wealth is the object of household management, and the whole
idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money
without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition
in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon living
well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the
means of gratifying them should be without limit. Those who do aim at
a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since
the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed
in getting wealth: and so there arises the second species of wealth-getting.
For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art which produces
the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to supply their pleasures
by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every
faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for
example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence;
neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art;
but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some
men turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they
conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all
things must contribute.
Thus, then,
we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and
why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which
we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part
of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of
food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
Part X
And we
have found the answer to our original question, Whether the art of getting
wealth is the business of the manager of a household and of the statesman
or not their business? viz., that wealth is presupposed by them. For
as political science does not make men, but takes them from nature and
uses them, so too nature provides them with earth or sea or the like
as a source of food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager of
a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies; he may
be compared to the weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to
know, too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable.
Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of getting
wealth is a part of the management of a household and the art of medicine
not; for surely the members of a household must have health just as
they must have life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from
one point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state
have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but
the physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another
way the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly
speaking, as I have already said, the means of life must be provided
beforehand by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food
to that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always what
remains over of that from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of
getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.
There are
two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household
management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable,
while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is
unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated
sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out
of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was
intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And
this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied
to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent.
Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.
Part XI
Enough
has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now proceed
to the practical part. The discussion of such matters is not unworthy
of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal and
irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are, first, the knowledge
of livestock- which are most profitable, and where, and how- as, for
example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are
most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of these pay
better than others, and which pay best in particular places, for some
do better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which
may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish,
or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. These are the
divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first.
Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important
division is commerce (of which there are three kinds- the provision
of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for sale- these again differing
as they are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third,
service for hire- of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts,
the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a third sort
of wealth getting intermediate between this and the first or natural
mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange, viz.,
the industries that make their profit from the earth, and from things
growing from the earth which, although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless
profitable; for example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art
of mining, by which minerals are obtained, itself has many branches,
for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several
divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration
of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell
upon them at greater length now.
Those occupations
are most truly arts in which there is the least element of chance; they
are the meanest in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile
in which there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal
in which there is the least need of excellence.
Works have
been written upon these subjects by various persons; for example, by
Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of
Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of other branches; any
one who cares for such matters may refer to their writings. It would
be well also to collect the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals
have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons
who value the art of getting wealth. There is the anecdote of Thales
the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a principle of
universal application, but is attributed to him on account of his reputation
for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed to
show that philosophy was of no use. According to the story, he knew
by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be
a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money,
he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus,
which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him. When the
harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of a sudden,
he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity of
money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can easily be rich
if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is supposed
to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying,
his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and is nothing
but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by cities
when they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provisions.
There was
a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him, bought up an
the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their
various markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much
increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard,
he told him that he might take away his money, but that he must not
remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way
of making money which was injurious to his own interests. He made the
same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for
themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know these things; for a
state is often as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining
it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves
entirely to finance.
Part XII
Of household
management we have seen that there are three parts- one is the rule
of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already, another of
a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw,
rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule
over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule.
For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male
is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and
full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most
constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for
the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens
are equal, and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and
the other is ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms
and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying
of Amasis about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female
is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of
a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of
love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power.
And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and
men,' because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural
superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with
them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.
Part XIII
Thus it
is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition
of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence
of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more
than to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether
there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely
instrumental and ministerial qualities- whether he can have the virtues
of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess
only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer
the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what
will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men
and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have
no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children,
whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave
and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or
note So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural
subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble
nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always rule,
and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question
of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference
of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange
is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not,
to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can
he rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious
and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore,
that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural
subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the
soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other
is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different
from that of the subject; the one being the virtue of the rational,
and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same
principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and
are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman
rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male
rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts
of the soul are present in an of them, they are present in different
degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman
has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.
So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also;
all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is
required by each for the fulfillment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought
to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely,
demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer;
the subjects, oil the other hand, require only that measure of virtue
which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs
to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage
and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained,
the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in
obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as will be more clearly
seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that
virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly,
or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions
is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the virtues.
All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the
poet says of women,
"Silence
is a woman's glory, "
but this
is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore
obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect
man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is
relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the
wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much
virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice
or lack of self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying
is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they
often fail in their work through the lack of self control? But is there
not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his
master's life; the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only
attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort
of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave
exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest,
then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the
slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains
the slave in his duties. Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to
converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for
slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.
So much
for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is
good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and good and
escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different
forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state,
and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of
the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and children
must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if the
virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the
virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children
grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.
Of these
matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another
time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make
a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of
a perfect state.
I
| II | III
| IV | V
| VI | VII
| VIII