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Preface
In a revolutionary
period it is very difficult to keep abreast of events, which provide
an astonishing amount of new material for an evaluation of the tactical
slogans of revolutionary parties. The present pamphlet was written before
the Odessa events.1) We have already pointed out in the Proletary (No.
9 — "Revolution Teaches") that these events have forced
even those Social-Democrats who created the "uprising-as-a-process"
theory and who rejected propaganda for a provisional revolutionary government
actually to pass over, or begin to pass over, to the side of their opponents.
Revolution undoubtedly teaches with a rapidity and thoroughness which
appear incredible in peaceful periods of political development. And,
what is particularly important, it teaches not only the leaders, but
the masses as well.
There is
not the slightest doubt that the revolution will teach social-democratism
to the masses of the workers in Russia. The revolution will confirm
the program and tactics of Social-Democracy in actual practice, by demonstrating
the true nature of the various classes of society, by demonstrating
the bourgeois character of our democracy and the real aspirations of
the peasantry, who, while being revolutionary in the bourgeois-democratic
sense, harbour not the idea of "socialisation," but of a new
class struggle between the peasant bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat.
The old illusions of the old Narodism, which are so clearly visible,
for instance, in the draft programme of the Socialist-Revolutionary
Party on the question of the development of capitalism in Russia, the
question of the democratic character of our "society" and
the question of the significance of a complete victory of a peasant
uprising—all these illusions will be mercilessly and completely
blown to the winds by the revolution. For the first time it will give
the various classes their real political baptism. These classes will
emerge from the revolution with a definite political physiognomy, for
they will have revealed themselves, not only in the programs and tactical
slogans of their ideologists, but also in the open political action
of the masses.
Undoubtedly,
the revolution will teach us, and will teach the masses of the people.
But the question that now confronts a militant political party is: shall
we be able to teach the revolution anything? shall we be able to make
use of the correctness of our Social-Democratic doctrine, of our bond
with the only thoroughly revolutionary class, the proletariat, to put
a proletarian imprint on the revolution, to carry the revolution to
a real and decisive victory, not in word but indeed, and to paralyse
the instability, half-heartedness and treachery of the democratic bourgeoisie?
It is to
this end that we must direct all our efforts, and the achievement of
it will depend, on the one hand, on the accuracy of our appraisal of
the political situation, on the correctness of our tactical slogans,
and, on the other hand, on whether these slogans will be backed by the
real fighting strength of the masses of the workers. All the usual,
regular, current work of all the organisations and groups of our Party,
the work of propaganda, agitation and organisation, is directed towards
strengthening and expanding the ties with the masses. This work is always
necessary; but in a revolutionary period less than in any other can
it be considered sufficient. At such a time the working class feels
an instinctive urge for open revolutionary action, and we must learn
to set the aims of this action correctly, and then make these aims as
widely known and understood as possible. It must not be forgotten that
the current pessimism about our ties with the masses very often serves
as a screen for bourgeois ideas regarding the role of the proletariat
in the revolution. Undoubtedly, we still have a great deal to do to
educate and organise the working class; but the whole question now is:
where should the main political emphasis in this work of education and
of organisation be placed? On the trade unions and legally existing
societies, or on armed insurrection, on the work of creating a revolutionary
army and a revolutionary government? Both serve to educate and organise
the working class. Both are, of course, necessary. But the whole question
now, in the present revolution, amounts to this: what is to be emphasised
in the work of educating and organising the working class, the former
or the latter?
The outcome
of the revolution depends on whether the working class will play the
part of a subsidiary to the bourgeoisie, a subsidiary that is powerful
in the force of its onslaught against the autocracy but impotent politically,
or whether it will play the part of leader of the people's revolution.
The more intelligent representatives of the bourgeoisie are perfectly
aware of this. That is precisely why the Osvobozhdeniye praises Akimovism,
Economism in Social-Democracy, the trend, which is now placing the trade
unions and the legally existing societies in the forefront. That is
precisely why Mr. Struve welcomes (in the Osvobozhdeniye, No. 72) the
Akimovist trends in the principles of the new Iskra. That is why he
comes down so heavily on the detested revolutionary narrowness of the
decisions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour
Party.
It is exceptionally
important at the present time for Social-Democracy to have correct tactical
slogans for leading the masses. There is nothing more dangerous in a
revolutionary period than belittling the importance of tactical slogans
that are sound in principle. For example, the [Menshevik] Iskra in No.
104, actually passes over to the side of its opponents in the Social-Democratic
movement, and yet, at the same time, disparages the importance of slogans
and tactical decisions that are in front of the times and indicate the
path along which the movement is proceeding, with a number of failures,
errors, etc. On the contrary, the working out of correct tactical decisions
is of immense importance for a party which, in the spirit of the sound
principles of Marxism, desires to lead the proletariat and not merely
to drag at the tail of events. In the resolutions of the Third Congress
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference
of the section which has seceded from the Party2), we have the most
precise, most carefully thought-out, and most complete expression of
tactical views—views not casually expressed by individual writers,
but accepted by the responsible representatives of the Social-Democratic
proletariat. Our Party is in advance of all the others, for it has a
precise program, accepted by all. It must also set the other parties
an example of strict adherence to its tactical resolutions, in contradistinction
to the opportunism of the democratic bourgeoisie of the Osvobozhdeniye
and the revolutionary phrase-mongering of the Socialist-Revolutionaries,
who only during the revolution suddenly thought of coming for ward with
a "draft" of a program and of investigating for the first
time whether it is a bourgeois revolution that is going on in front
of their eyes.
That is
why we think it a most urgent task of the revolutionary Social-Democrats
to study carefully the tactical resolutions of the Third Congress of
the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and of the Conference, to
define what deviations there are in them from the principles of Marxism,
and to get a clear understanding of the concrete tasks of the Social-Democratic
proletariat in a democratic revolution. It is to this task that the
present pamphlet is devoted. The testing of our tactics from the standpoint
of the principles of Marxism and of the lessons of the revolution is
also necessary for those who really desire to pave the way for unity
of tactics as a basis for the future complete unity of the whole Russian
Social-Democratic Labour Party, and not to confine themselves solely
to verbal admonitions.
An
Urgent Political Question
At the
present revolutionary juncture the question of the convocation of a
popular constituent assembly is on the order of the day. Opinions are
divided on the point as to how this question should be solved. Three
political trends are to be observed. The tsarist government admits the
necessity of convening representatives of the people, but it does not
want under any circumstances to permit their assembly to be a popular
and a constituent assembly. It seems willing to agree, if we are to
believe the newspaper reports on the work of the Bulygin Commission,
to an advisory assembly, to be elected without freedom to conduct agitation,
and on the basis of restricted qualifications or a restricted class
system. The revolutionary proletariat, inasmuch as it is led by the
Social-Democratic Party, demands complete transfer of power to a constituent
assembly, and for this purpose strives to obtain not only universal
suffrage and complete freedom to conduct agitation, but also the immediate
overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional
revolutionary government. Finally, the liberal bourgeoisie, expressing
its wishes through the leaders of the so-called "Constitutional-Democratic
Party" does not demand the overthrow of the tsarist government,
does not advance the slogan of a provisional government and does not
insist on real guarantees that the elections will be absolutely free
and fair and that the assembly of representatives will be a genuinely
popular and a genuinely constituent assembly. As a matter of fact, the
liberal bourgeoisie, the only serious social support of the Osvobozhdeniye
trend, is striving to effect as peaceful a deal as possible between
the tsar and the revolutionary people, a deal, moreover, that would
give a maximum of power to itself, the bourgeoisie, and a minimum to
the revolutionary people—the proletariat and the peasantry.
Such is
the political situation at the present time. Such are the three main
political trends, corresponding to the three main social forces in contemporary
Russia. We have already shown on more than one occasion (in the Proletary,
Nos. 3, 4, 5) how the Osvobozhdentsi use pseudo-democratic phrases to
cover up their half-hearted, or, to put it more bluntly and plainly,
their treacherous, perfidious policy towards the revolution. Let us
now see how the Social-Democrats appraise the tasks of the moment. Excellent
material for this purpose is provided by the two resolutions that were
passed quite recently by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party and by the "Conference" of the section which
has seceded from the Party. The question as to which of these resolutions
more correctly appraises the political situation and more correctly
defines the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat is of enormous
importance, and every Social-Democrat who is anxious to fulfil his duties
as a propagandist, agitator and organiser intelligently, must study
this question with the closest attention, leaving all irrelevant considerations
entirely aside.
By the
Party's tactics we mean the Party's political conduct, or the character,
the direction and methods of its political activity. Tactical resolutions
are adopted by Party congresses in order precisely to define the political
conduct of the Party as a whole with regard to new tasks, or in view
of a new political situation. Such a new situation has been created
by the revolution that has started in Russia, i.e., the complete, resolute
and open rupture between the overwhelming majority of the people and
the tsarist government. The new question concerns the practical methods
to be adopted in convening a genuinely popular and genuinely constituent
assembly (the theoretical question concerning such an assembly was officially
settled by Social-Democracy long ago, before all other parties, in its
Party program). Since the people have broken with the government, and
the masses realise the necessity of setting up a new order, the party
which set itself the object of overthrowing the government must necessarily
consider what government to put up in place of the old, deposed government.
A new question concerning a provisional revolutionary government arises.
In order to give a complete answer to this question the Party of the
class-conscious proletariat must make clear:
1) the
significance of a provisional revolutionary government in the revolution
that is now going on and in the entire struggle of the proletariat in
general;
2) its
attitude towards a provisional revolutionary government;
3) the
precise conditions of Social-Democratic participation in this government;
4) the
conditions under which pressure is to be brought to bear on this government
from below, i.e., in the event of there being no Social-Democrats in
it. Only after all these questions are made clear, will the political
conduct of the Party in this sphere be principled, clear and firm.
Let us
now consider how the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian
Social-Democratic Labour Party answers these questions. The following
is the full text of the resolution:
"Resolution
on a Provisional Revolutionary Government
"Whereas:
"1)
both the direct interests of the proletariat and the interests of its
struggle for the final aims of socialism require the fullest possible
measure of political liberty and, consequently, the replacement of the
autocratic form of government by a democratic republic;
"2)
the establishment of a democratic republic in Russia is possible only
as a result of a victorious popular insurrection whose organ will be
a provisional revolutionary government, which alone will be capable
of ensuring complete freedom of agitation during the election campaign
and of convening a constituent assembly that will really express the
will of the people, an assembly elected on the basis of universal and
equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot;
"3)
under the present social and economic order this democratic revolution
in Russia will not weaken, but strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie,
which at a certain moment will inevitably try, stopping at nothing,
to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the
revolutionary period as possible:
"The
Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party resolves
that:
"a)
that it is necessary to disseminate among the working class a concrete
idea of the most probable course of the revolution and of the necessity,
at a certain moment in the revolution, for the appearance of a provisional
revolutionary government, from which the proletariat will demand the
realisation of all the immediate political and economic demands contained
in our program (the minimum program);
"b)
that subject to the relation of forces, and other factors which cannot
be exactly determined beforehand, representatives of our Party may participate
in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of relentless
struggle against all counterrevolutionary attempts and of the defence
of the independent interests of the working class;
"c)
that an indispensable condition for such participation is that the Party
should exercise strict control over its representatives and that the
independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which is striving for a
complete socialist revolution and, consequently, is irreconcilably hostile
to all bourgeois parties, should be strictly maintained;
"d)
that irrespective whether the participation of Social-Democrats in the
provisional revolutionary government prove possible or not, we must
propagate among the broadest masses of the proletariat the necessity
for permanent pressure to be brought to bear upon the provisional government
by the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, for the
purpose of defending, consolidating and extending the gains of the revolution."
What
Can We Learn From the Resolution of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
on a Provisional Revolutionary Government?
As is evident
from the title, the resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian
Social-Democratic Labour Party, is devoted wholly and exclusively to
the question of a provisional revolutionary government. Hence, the participation
of Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government is included
in it as part of that question. On the other hand, it deals only with
a provisional revolutionary government and with nothing else; consequently,
it completely leaves out, for example, the question of the "conquest
of power" in general, etc. Was the Congress right in eliminating
this and similar questions? Undoubtedly it was right, because the political
situation in Russia does not at all give rise to such questions as immediate
issues. On the contrary, the whole of the issue that has been raised
by the people at the present time is the overthrow of the autocracy
and the convocation of a constituent assembly. Party congresses should
take up and decide not issues which this or that writer happened to
mention, but those that are of vital political importance by reason
of the prevailing conditions and the objective course of social development.
Of what
importance is a provisional revolutionary government in the present
revolution, and in the general struggle of the proletariat? The resolution
of the Congress explains this by pointing at the very outset to the
need for the "fullest possible measure of political liberty,"
both from the standpoint of the immediate interests of the proletariat
and from the standpoint of the "final aims of Socialism."
And complete political liberty requires that the tsarist autocracy be
replaced by a democratic republic, as our Party program has already
recognised. The stress laid in the Congress resolution on the slogan
of a democratic republic is necessary both as a matter of logic and
in point of principle, for it is precisely complete freedom that the
proletariat, as the foremost champion of democracy, is striving to attain.
Moreover, it is all the more advisable to stress this at the present
time because right now the monarchists, namely, the so-called constitutional-"democratic"
party, or party of "liberation," in our country, are flying
the flag of "democracy." In order to establish a republic
it is absolutely necessary to have an assembly of people's representatives;
and it must be a popular (elected on the basis of universal and equal
suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot), and a constituent assembly.
This exactly what is recognised in the Congress resolution, further
on. But the resolution does not stop there. In order to establish the
new order "that will really express the will of the people"
it is not enough to call a representative assembly a constituent assembly.
This assembly must have the authority and power to "constitute."
Taking this into consideration, the resolution of the Congress does
not confine itself to the formal slogan of a "constituent assembly,"
but adds the material conditions which alone will enable that assembly
really to carry out its tasks. Such specification of the conditions
that will enable an assembly which is constituent in name to become
constituent in fact is imperatively necessary, for, as we have pointed
out more than once, the liberal bourgeoisie, as represented by the Constitutional-Monarchist
Party, is deliberately distorting the slogan of a popular constituent
assembly and reducing it to a hollow phrase.
The Congress
resolution states that a provisional revolutionary government on its
own — one, moreover, that will be the organ of a victorious popular
insurrection — can secure full freedom of agitation in the election
campaign and convene an assembly that will really express the will of
the people. Is this postulate correct? Whoever took it into his head
to dispute it would have to assert that it is possible for the tsarist
government not to side with the reaction, that it is capable of being
neutral during the elections, that it will see to it that the will of
the people is really expressed. Such assertions are so absurd that no
one would venture to defend them openly; but they are being surreptitiously
smuggled in under liberal colours, by our liberationists. Somebody must
convene the constituent assembly, somebody must guarantee the freedom
and fairness of the elections; somebody must invest such an assembly
with full power and authority. Only a revolutionary government, which
is the organ of the insurrection, can desire this in all sincerity and
be capable of doing all that is required to achieve this. The tsarist
government will inevitably counteract this. A liberal government, which
will come to terms with the tsar, and which does not rely in full on
the popular uprising, cannot sincerely desire this, and could not accomplish
it even if it most sincerely desired to. Therefore, the resolution of
the Congress gives the only correct and entirely consistent democratic
slogan.
But an
appraisal of a provisional revolutionary government's significance would
be incomplete and wrong if the class nature of the democratic revolution
were lost sight of. The resolution therefore adds that the revolution
will strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie. This is inevitable under
the present, i.e., capitalist, social and economic system. And the strengthening
of the bourgeoisie's rule over the proletariat which has secured some
measure of political liberty must inevitably lead to a desperate struggle
between them for power, must lead to desperate attempts on the part
of the bourgeoisie "to take away from the proletariat the gains
of the revolutionary period." Therefore the proletariat, which
is fighting for democracy in front of all and at the head of all, must
not for a single moment forget about the new antagonisms that are inherent
in bourgeois democracy and about the new struggle.
Thus, the
section of the resolution which we have just reviewed fully appraises
the significance of a provisional revolutionary government in its relation
to the struggle for freedom and for a republic, in its relation to a
constituent assembly and in its relation to the democratic revolution,
which clears the ground for a new class struggle.
The next
question is that of the proletariat's attitude in general towards a
provisional revolutionary government. The Congress resolution answers
this first of all by directly advising the Party to spread among the
working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government
is necessary. The working class must be made aware of this necessity.
Whereas the "democratic" bourgeoisie leaves the question of
overthrowing the tsarist government in the shade, we must push it to
the fore and insist on the need for a provisional revolutionary government.
More than that, we must outline for such a government a program of action
that will conform with the objective conditions of the historic period
through which we are now passing and with the aims of proletarian democracy.
This program is the entire minimum program of our Party, the program
of the immediate political and economic reforms which, on the one hand,
can be fully realised on the basis of the existing social and economic
relationships and, on the other hand, are requisite for the next step
forward, for the achievement of Socialism.
Thus, the
resolution fully clearly defines the nature and aims of a provisional
revolutionary government. In its origin and fundamental nature such
a government must be the organ of the popular insurrection. Its formal
purpose must be to serve as the instrument for convening a popular constituent
assembly. The content of its activities must be to put into effect the
minimum program of proletarian democracy, the only program capable of
safeguarding the interests of the people which has risen against the
autocracy.
It might
be argued that being only provisional, a provisional government cannot
carry out a constructive program which has not yet received the approval
of the entire people. Such an argument would merely be the sophistry
of reactionaries and "absolutists." To abstain from carrying
out a constructive program means tolerating the existence of the feudal
regime of the putrid autocracy. Such a regime could be tolerated only
by a government of traitors to the cause of the revolution, but not
by a government which is the organ of a popular insurrection. It would
be mockery for anyone to propose that we should refrain from exercising
freedom of assembly pending the confirmation of such freedom by a constituent
assembly, on the plea that the constituent assembly might not confirm
freedom of assembly! It is equal mockery to object to the immediate
execution of the minimum program by a provisional revolutionary government.
Finally,
we will note that the resolution, by making implementation of the minimum
program provisional revolutionary government's task eliminates the absurd,
semi-anarchist ideas about giving immediate effect to the maximum program,
and the conquest of power for a socialist revolution. The degree of
economic development of Russia (an objective condition) and the degree
of class consciousness and organisation of the broad masses of the proletariat
(a subjective condition inseparably connected with the objective condition)
make the immediate complete emancipation of the working class impossible.
Only the most ignorant people can ignore the bourgeois nature of the
democratic revolution which is now taking place; only the most naive
optimists can forget how little as yet the masses of the workers are
informed about the aims of Socialism and about the methods of achieving
it. And we are all convinced that the emancipation of the workers can
be effected only by the workers themselves; a socialist revolution is
out of the question unless the masses become class conscious and organised,
trained and educated in open class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie.
In answer to the anarchist objections that we are putting off the socialist
revolution, we say: we are not putting it off, but we are taking the
first step towards it in the only possible way, along the only correct
road, namely, the road of a democratic republic. Whoever wants to reach
Socialism by a different road, other than that of political democracy,
will inevitably arrive at conclusions that are absurd and reactionary
both in the economic and the political sense. If any workers ask us
at the given moment why we should not go ahead and carry out our maximum
program, we shall answer by pointing out how far the masses of the democratically-minded
people still are from Socialism, how undeveloped class antagonisms still
are, how unorganised the proletarians still are. Organise hundreds of
thousands of workers all over Russia; enlist the sympathy of millions
for our program! Try to do this without confining yourselves to high-sounding
but hollow anarchist phrases—and you will see at once that in
order to achieve this organisation, in order to spread this socialist
enlightenment, we must achieve the fullest possible measure of democratic
reforms.
Let us
continue. Once we are clear about the importance of a provisional revolutionary
government and the attitude of the proletariat toward it, the following
question arises: is it permissible for us to participate in it (action
from above) and, if so, under what conditions? What should be our action
from below? The resolution supplies precise answers to both these questions.
It emphatically declares that it is permissible in principle for Social-Democrats
to participate in a provisional revolutionary government (during the
period of a democratic revolution, the period of struggle for a republic).
By this declaration we once and for all dissociate ourselves both from
the anarchists, who answer this question in the negative on principle,
and from the khvostists among the Social-Democrats (like Martynov and
the new Iskra-ists) who have tried to frighten us with the prospect
of a situation wherein it might prove necessary for us to participate
in such a government. By this declaration the Third Congress of the
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party rejected, once and for all, the
idea expressed by the new Iskra that the participation of Social-Democrats
in a provisional revolutionary government would be a variety of Millerandism,
that it is impermissible in principle, as sanctifying the bourgeois
order, etc.
It stands
to reason, however, that the question of permissibility in principle
does not solve the question of practical expediency. Under what conditions
is this new form of struggle—the struggle "from above"
recognised by the Party Congress—expedient? It goes without saying
that at the present time it is impossible to speak of concrete conditions,
such as relation of forces, etc., and the resolution, naturally, refrains
from defining these conditions in advance. No intelligent person would
venture at the present time to prophesy anything on this subject. What
we can and must do is determine the nature and aim of our participation.
This is precisely what is done in the resolution, which points out two
objectives of our participation: 1) a relentless struggle against counterrevolutionary
attempts, and 2) the defence of the independent interests of the working
class. At a time when the liberal bourgeoisie is beginning to talk assiduously
about the psychology of reaction (see Mr. Struve's most instructive
"Open Letter" in the Osvobozhdeniye, No. 71) in an attempt
to frighten the revolutionary people and induce it to show compliance
towards the autocracy—at such a time it is particularly appropriate
for the party of the proletariat to call attention to the task of waging
a real war against counterrevolution. In the final analysis, force alone
settles the great problems of political liberty and the class struggle,
and it is our business to prepare and organise this force and to employ
it actively, not only for defence, but also for attack. The long reign
of political reaction in Europe, which has lasted almost uninterruptedly
since the days of the Paris Commune, has too greatly accustomed us to
the idea that action can proceed only "from below," has too
greatly inured us to seeing only defensive struggles. We have now, undoubtedly,
entered a new era: a period of political upheavals and revolutions has
begun. In a period such as Russia is passing through at the present
time, it is impermissible to confine ourselves to old, stereotyped formulae.
We must propagate the idea of action from above, we must prepare for
the most energetic, offensive action, and must study the conditions
for and forms of such actions. The Congress resolution puts two of these
conditions into the forefront: one refers to the formal aspect of Social-Democratic
participation in a provisional revolutionary government (strict control
by the Party over its representatives), the other to the very nature
of such participation (never for an instant to lose sight of the aim
of effecting a complete socialist revolution).
Having
thus explained from all aspects the Party's policy with regard to action
"from above"—this new, hitherto almost unprecedented
method of struggle—the resolution also provides for the eventuality
that we shall not be able to act from above. We must exercise pressure
on the provisional revolutionary government from below in any case.
In order to be able to exercise this pressure from below, the proletariat
must be armed—for in a revolutionary situation matters develop
with exceptional rapidity to the stage of open civil war—and must
be led by the Social-Democratic Party. The object of its armed pressure
is that of "defending, consolidating and extending the gains of
the revolution," i.e., those gains which from the standpoint of
the interests of the proletariat must consist in the fulfilment of the
whole of our minimum program.
With this
we conclude our brief analysis of the resolution of the Third Congress
on a provisional revolutionary government. As the reader can see, the
resolution explains the importance of this new question, the attitude
of the Party of the proletariat toward it, and the policy the Party
must pursue both inside a provisional revolutionary government and outside
of it.
Let us
now consider the corresponding resolution of the "Conference."
What
Is A "Decisive Victory of the Revolution Over Tsarism"?
The resolution
of the "Conference" is devoted to the question: "The
conquest of power and participation in a provisional government."
As we have already pointed out, the very manner in which the question
is presented betrays confusion. On the one hand, the question is presented
in a narrow way: it deals only with our participation in a provisional
government and not with the Party's tasks in regard to a provisional
revolutionary government in general. On the other hand, two totally
different questions are confused, viz., the question of our participation
at one of the stages of the democratic revolution, and the question
of the socialist revolution. Indeed, the "conquest of power"
by Social-Democracy is a socialist revolution, nor can it be anything
else if we use these words in their direct and usually accepted sense.
If, however, we are to understand these words to mean the conquest of
power for a democratic revolution and not for a socialist revolution,
then what is the point in talking not only about participation in a
provisional revolutionary government but also about the "conquest
of power" in general? Obviously our "Conferencers" were
not very clear themselves as to what they should talk about: the democratic
or the socialist revolution. Those who have followed the literature
on this question know that it was Comrade Martynov, in his notorious
Two Dictatorships; the new-Iskrists are reluctant to recall the manner
in which this question was presented (even before January 9) [the date
of Bloody Sunday] in that model of tail-ender writing. Nevertheless,
there can be no doubt that it exerted an ideological influence on the
Conference.
But let
us leave the title of the resolution. Its contents reveal mistakes incomparably
more profound and serious. Here is the first part:
"A
decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may be marked either
by the establishment of a provisional government, which will emerge
from a victorious popular insurrection, or by the revolutionary initiative
of a representative institution of one kind or another, which, under
direct revolutionary pressure of the people, decides to set up a popular
constituent assembly."
Thus, we
are told that a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism may
be marked either by a victorious insurrection, or . . . by a decision
of a representative institution to set up a constituent assembly! What
does this mean? How are we to understand it? A decisive victory may
be marked by a "decision" to set up a constituent assembly??
And such a "victory" is put side by side with the establishment
of a provisional government which will "emerge from a victorious
popular insurrection"!! The Conference failed to note that a victorious
popular insurrection and the establishment of a provisional government
would signify the victory of the revolution in actual fact, whereas
a "decision" to set up a constituent assembly would signify
a victory of the revolution in words only.
The Conference
of the Mensheviks, or new-Iskra, fell into the very same error that
the liberals, the Osvobozhdeniye are constantly committing. The Osvobozhdeniye
group prattle about a "constituent" assembly and bashfully
shut their eyes to the fact that power and authority remain in the hands
of the tsar, forgetting that in order to "constitute" one
must possess the power to do so. The Conference also forgot that it
is a far cry from a "decision" adopted by representatives—no
matter who they are—to the fulfilment of that decision. The Conference
further forgot that so long as power remained in the hands of the tsar,
all decisions passed by any representatives whatsoever would remain
empty and miserable prattle, as was the case with the "decisions"
of the Frankfurt Parliament, famous in the history of the German Revolution
of 1848. In his Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Marx, the representative of
the revolutionary proletariat, castigated the Frankfurt liberal Osvobozhdentsi
with merciless sarcasm precisely because they uttered fine words, adopted
all sorts of democratic "decisions," "constituted"
all kinds of liberties, while actually they left power in the hands
of the king and failed to organise an armed struggle against the military
forces at the disposal of the king. And while the Frankfurt Osvobozbdentsi
were prattling—the king bided his time, consolidated his military
forces, and the counterrevolution, relying on real force, utterly routed
the democrats with all their fine "decisions."
The Conference
put on a par with a decisive victory the very thing that lacks the essential
condition of victory. How was it possible for Social-Democrats who recognise
the republican program of our Party to commit such an error? In order
to understand this strange phenomenon we must turn to the resolution
of the Third Congress on the section which has seceded from the Party.
This resolution refers to the fact that various trends "akin to
Economism" have survived in our Party. Our "Conferencers"
(it is not for nothing that they are under the ideological guidance
of Martynov) talk of the revolution in exactly the same way as the Economists
talked of the political struggle or the eight hour day. The Economists
immediately gave currency to the "theory of stages":
1) the
struggle for rights,
2) political agitation,
3) political struggle;
or,
1) a ten-hour
day,
2) a nine-hour day,
3) an eight-hour day.
The results
of this "tactics-as-a-process" are sufficiently well known
to all. Now we are invited nicely to divide the revolution too in advance
into the following stages:
1) the
tsar convenes a representative body;
2) this
representative body "decides" under pressure of the "people"
to set up a constituent assembly;
3) . .
. the Mensheviks have not yet agreed among themselves as to the third
stage; they have forgotten that the revolutionary pressure of the people
will meet with the counterrevolutionary pressure of tsarism and that,
therefore, either the "decision" will remain unfulfilled or
the issue will be decided after all by the victory or the defeat of
the popular insurrection. The resolution of the Conference is an exact
reproduction of the following reasoning of the Economists: a decisive
victory of the workers may be marked either by the realisation of the
eight-hour day in a revolutionary way, or by the grant of a ten-hour
day and a "decision" to go over to a nine-hour day. . . .
the duplication is perfect.
The objection
may be made to us that the authors of the resolution did not mean to
place on a par the victory of an insurrection with the "decision"
of a representative institution convened by the tsar, that they only
wanted to provide for the Party's tactics in either case. To this our
answer would be:
1) The
text of the resolution plainly and unambiguously describes the decision
of a representative institution as "a decisive victory of the revolution
over tsarism." Perhaps that is the result of careless wording,
perhaps it could be corrected after consulting the minutes, but, so
long as it is not corrected, the present wording can have only one meaning,
and this meaning is entirely in keeping with the Osvobozhdeniye line
of reasoning.
2) The
Osvobozbdeniye line of reasoning, into which the authors of the resolution
have drifted, stands out in incomparably greater relief in other literary
productions of the new Iskra-ists. For instance, the organ of the Tiflis
Committee, (in the Georgian language; praised by the Iskra in No. 100),
in the article "The Zemsky Sobor [National Assmebly] and Our Tactics,"
Sotsial-Demokrat, organ of the Tfilis Committee (published in the Georgian
language; praised by Iskra in No. 100) goes so far as to say that the
"Tactics" "which make the Zemsky Sobor the centre of
our activities" (about the convocation of which, we may add, nothing
definite is known as yet!) "are more advantageous for us"
than the "tactics" of armed insurrection and the establishment
of a provisional revolutionary government. We shall refer to this article
again further on.
3) No objection
can be made to a preliminary discussion of what tactics the Party should
adopt in the event of the victory of the revolution as well as in the
event of its defeat, in the event of a successful insurrection as well
as in the event of the insurrection failing to develop into a serious
force. It is possible that the tsarist government will succeed in convening
a representative assembly for the purpose of coming to terms with the
liberal bourgeoisie; providing for that eventuality, the resolution
of the Third Congress speaks plainly about "hypocritical policy,"
"pseudo democracy," "a travesty of popular representation,
something like the so-called Zemsky Sobor."
But the
whole point is that this is not said in the resolution on a provisional
revolutionary government, for it has nothing to do with a provisional
revolutionary government. This eventuality defers the problem of the
insurrection and of the establishment of a provisional revolutionary
government; it alters this problem, etc. The point in question now is
not that all kinds of combinations are possible, that both victory and
defeat are possible, that there may be direct or circuitous paths; the
point is that it is impermissible for a Social-Democrat to cause confusion
in the minds of the workers concerning the genuinely revolutionary path,
that it is impermissible, to describe in the Osvobozhdeniye manner,
as a decisive victory that which lacks the main requisite for victory.
It is possible that even the eight-hour day we will get not at one stroke,
but only by a long and roundabout way; but what would you say of a man
who calls such impotence, such weakness as renders the proletariat incapable
of counteracting procrastination, delays, haggling, treachery and reaction,
a victory for the workers? It is possible that the Russian revolution
will end in an "abortive constitution," as was once stated
in the Vperyod, but can this justify a Social-Democrat, who on the eve
of a decisive struggle would call this abortion a "decisive victory
over tsarism"? It is possible that, at the worst, not only will
we not win a republic, but that even the constitution we will get will
be an illusory one, a constitution "à la Shipov, [A] but
would it be pardonable for a Social-Democrat to obscure our slogan of
a republic?
Of course
the new-Iskraists have not as yet gone so far as to obscure it. But
the degree to which the revolutionary spirit has fled from them, the
degree to which lifeless pedantry has blinded them to the militant tasks
of the moment is most vividly shown by the fact that in their resolution
they, of all things, forgot to say a word about the republic. It is
incredible, but it is a fact. All the slogans of Social-Democracy were
endorsed, repeated, explained and presented in detail in the various
resolutions of the Conference—even the election of shop stewards
and deputies by the workers was not forgotten, but in a resolution on
a provisional revolutionary government they simply did not find occasion
to mention the republic. To talk of the "victory" of the people's
insurrection, of the establishment of a provisional government, and
not to indicate what relation these "steps" and acts have
to the winning of a republic—means writing a resolution not for
the guidance of the proletarian struggle, but for the purpose of hobbling
along at the tail end of the proletarian movement.
To sum
up: the first part of the resolution
1) gave
no explanation whatever of the significance of a provisional revolutionary
government from the standpoint of the struggle for a republic and of
securing a genuinely popular and genuinely constituent assembly;
2) confused
the democratic consciousness of the proletariat by placing on a par
with a decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism a state of affairs
in which precisely the main requisite for a real victory is lacking.
The
Abolition of the Monarchist System and the Republic
Let us
go over to the next section of the resolution:
"....in
either case such a victory will inaugurate a new phase in the revolutionary
epoch.
"The
final abolition of the whole regime of the monarchy and the social estates
in the process of mutual struggle between the elements of politically
emancipated bourgeois society for the satisfaction of their social interests
and for the direct acquisition of power—such is the task in this
new phase which the objective conditions of social development spontaneously
evoke.
"Therefore,
a provisional government that would under take to carry out the tasks
of this revolution, bourgeois in its historical nature, would, in regulating
the mutual struggle between antagonistic classes of a nation in the
process of emancipation, not only have to advance revolutionary development,
but also to combat factors in that development threatening the foundations
of the capitalist system."
Let us
examine this section which forms an independent part of the resolution.
The basic idea in the arguments quoted above coincides with the one
set forth in the third clause of the Congress resolution. However, collation
of these parts of the two resolutions will at once reveal the following
radical difference between them. The Congress resolution, which briefly
describes the social and economic basis of the revolution, concentrates
attention entirely on the clear-cut struggle of classes for definite
gains, and places in the fore front the militant tasks of the proletariat.
The resolution of the Conference, which carries a long, nebulous, and
confused description of the socio-economic basis of the revolution,
speaks very vaguely about a struggle for definite gains. and leaves
the militant tasks of the proletariat completely in the background.
The resolution of the Conference speaks of the old order in the process
of mutual struggle among the various elements of society. The Congress
resolution says that we, the party of the proletariat, must effect this
abolition; that only establishment of a democratic republic signifies
genuine abolition of the old order; that we must win that republic;
that we shall fight for it and for complete liberty, not only against
the autocracy, but also against the bourgeoisie, when it attempts (and
it will surely do so) to wrest our gains from us. The Congress resolution
calls on a definite class to wage a struggle for a precisely defined
immediate aim. The Conference resolution discourses on the mutual struggle
of various forces. One resolution expresses the psychology of active
struggle, the other that of the passive onlooker; one resounds with
the call for live action, the other is steeped in lifeless pedantry.
Both resolutions state that the present revolution is only our first
step, which will be followed by a second; but from this, one resolution
draws the conclusion that we must take this first step all the sooner,
get it over all the sooner, win a republic, mercilessly crush the counter-revolution,
and prepare the ground for the second step. The other resolution, however,
oozes, so to speak, with verbose descriptions of the first step and
(excuse the crude expression) simply masticates it. The Congress resolution
takes the old, yet eternally new, ideas of Marxism (the bourgeois nature
of a democratic revolution) as a preface or first premise, whence it
draws conclusions as to the progressive tasks of the progressive class,
which is fighting both for the democratic and for the socialist revolution.
The Conference resolution does not go beyond the preface, chewing it
over and over again, and trying to be clever about it.
This is
the very distinction which has long divided the Russian Marxists into
two wings: the moralising and the militant wings of the old days of
"legal Marxism", and the economic and political wings of the
period of the nascent mass movement. From the correct Marxist premise
concerning the deep economic roots of the class struggle in general
and of the political struggle in particular, the Economists have drawn
the singular conclusion that we must turn our backs on the political
struggle and retard its development, narrow its scope, and reduce its
aims. The political wing, on the contrary, has drawn a different conclusion
from these same premises, namely, that the deeper the roots of our present
struggle, the more widely, the more boldly, the more resolutely, and
with greater initiative must we wage this struggle. We have the very
same controversy before us now, only under different circumstances and
in a different form. From the premises that a democratic revolution
is far from being a socialist revolution, that the poor and needy are
by no means the only ones to be "interested" in it, that it
is deeply rooted in the inescapable needs and requirements of the whole
of bourgeois society—from these premises we draw the conclusion
that the advanced class must formulate its democratic aims all the more
boldly, express them all the more sharply and completely, put forward
the immediate slogan of a republic, and popularise the idea of the need
to establish a provisional revolutionary government and to crush the
counter revolution ruthlessly. Our opponents, the new-Iskra group however,
deduce from these very same premises that the democratic conclusions
should not be expressed fully, that the republic may be omitted from
the practical slogans, that we can refrain from popularising the idea
of the need for a provisional revolutionary government, that a mere
decision to convene a constituent assembly can be termed a decisive
victory, that there is no need to advance the task of combating counter-revolution
as our active aim, so that it may be submerged in a nebulous (and, as
we shall presently see, wrongly formulated) reference to a "process
of mutual struggle". This is not the language of political leaders,
but of archive fogeys.
The more
closely one examines the various formulations in the resolution of the
new-Iskra group, the clearer its aforementioned basic features become.
We are told, for in stance, of a "process of mutual struggle between
the elements of politically emancipated bourgeois society". Bearing
in mind the subject this resolution deals with (a provisional revolutionary
government) one asks in astonishment, "If you are referring to
the process of mutual struggle, how can you keep silent about the elements
which are politically enslaving bourgeois society? Do the 'conferees'
really imagine that, since they have assumed the revolution will be
victorious, these elements have already disappeared?" Such an idea
would be absurd in general and an expression of the greatest political
naíveté and political short-sightedness in particular.
After the revolution's victory over counter revolution the latter will
not disappear; on the contrary, it will inevitably start a new and even
more desperate struggle. Since the purpose of our resolution is to analyse
the tasks that will confront us when the revolution is victorious, it
is our duty to devote tremendous attention to the tasks of repelling
counter-revolutionary attacks (as is done in the Congress resolution),
and not to submerge these immediate, urgent, and vital political tasks
of a militant party in general discussions on what will happen after
the present revolutionary period, or what will happen when a "politically
emancipated society" already exists. Just as the Economists would,
by repeating the truism that politics are subordinated to economics,
cover up their incapacity to understand urgent political tasks, so the
newIskra-ists, by repeating the general truism that struggles will take
place in a politically emancipated society, cover up their failure to
understand the urgent revolutionary tasks of the political emancipation
of this society.
Take the
expression "the final abolition of the whole regime of social estates
and the monarchy." In plain language, the final abolition of the
monarchist system means the establishment of a democratic republic.
But our good Martynov and his admirers think that this expression is
far too simple and clear. They insist on rendering it "more profound"
and saying it more "cleverly." As a result, we get, on the
one hand, ridiculous and vain efforts to appear profound; on the other
hand, we get a description instead of a slogan, a sort of melancholy
looking backward instead of a stirring appeal to march forward. We get
the impression, not of living people eager to fight for a republic here
and now, but of fossilised mummies who sub specie aeternitatis [Latin:
from the viepoint of eternity] consider the question from the standpoint
of plusquamperfectum.
Let us
proceed further: ". . . the provisional government . . . would
undertake to carry out the tasks of this . . . bourgeois revolution."
. . . Here we see at once the result of the fact that our "Conferencers"
have overlooked a concrete question which confronts the political leaders
of the proletariat. The concrete question of a provisional revolutionary
government was obscured from their field of vision by the question of
the future series of governments which will carry out the aims of the
bourgeois revolution in general. If you want to consider the question
"historically," the example of any European country will show
you that it was a series of governments, not by any means "provisional,"
that carried out the historical aims of the bourgeois revolution, that
even the governments which defeated the revolution were nonetheless
forced to carry out the historical aims of that defeated revolution.
But what is called a "provisional revolutionary government"
is something altogether different from what you are referring to: that
is the name given to the government of a revolutionary epoch, which
directly replaces the overthrown government and rests on the insurrection
of the people, and not on some kind of representative institutions coming
from the people. A provisional revolutionary government is the organ
of struggle for the immediate victory of the revolution, for immediately
repelling counterrevolutionary attempts, and not by any means an organ
for carrying out the historical aims of the bourgeois revolution in
general. Gentlemen, let us leave it to the future historians of a future
Russkaya Starina to determine exactly what aims of the bourgeois revolution
we, or this or that government, shall have achieved—there will
be time enough to do that thirty years from now; at present we must
put forward slogans and give practical directives for the struggle for
a republic and for the proletariat's most active participation in this
struggle.
For the
reasons stated, the final propositions in the forgoing section of the
resolution which we have quoted above are also unsatisfactory. The expression
that the provisional government would have to "regulate" the
mutual struggle among the antagonistic classes is exceedingly inapt,
or at any rate awkwardly put; Marxists should not use such liberal,
Osvobozhdeniye formulations, which lead one to believe that it is possible
to have governments which serve not as organs of the class struggle
but as its "regulators". . . . The government would "not
only have to push revolutionary development further forward but also
fight against those of its factors which threaten the foundations of
the capitalist system." But it is the proletariat, the very same
in whose name the resolution is speaking, that constitutes this "factor"!
Instead of indicating just how the proletariat should "push revolutionary
development further forward" at the present time (push it further
than the constitutionalist bourgeois would care to go), instead of advice
to prepare definite ways and means of combating the bourgeoisie when
the latter turns against the conquests of the revolution, we are offered
a general description of a process, which does not say a word about
the concrete aims of our activity. The new Iskra-ist method of expressing
its views reminds one of Marx's opinion (in his famous "theses"
on Feuerbach) of the old materialism, which was alien to the ideas of
dialectics. The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various
ways, said Marx, the point, however, is to change it. Similarly, the
new-Iskraists can give a tolerable description and explanation of the
process of struggle which is taking place before their eyes, but they
are altogether incapable of giving a correct slogan for this struggle.
Good marchers but bad leaders, they belittle the materialist conception
of history by ignoring the active, leading and guiding part in history
which can and must be played by parties that understand the material
prerequisites of a revolution and that have placed themselves at the
head of the progressive classes.
How
Should "The Revolution Be Pushed Forward"?
Let us
quote the next section of the resolution:
"Under
such conditions, Social-Democracy must strive to maintain during the
whole course of the revolution, a position which will best of all secure
for it the possibility of pushing the revolution forward, which will
not tie the hands of Social-Democracy in its struggle against the inconsistent
and self-seeking policy of the bourgeois parties and which will preserve
it from being merged in bourgeois democracy.
"Therefore,
Social-Democracy must not set itself the aim of seizing or sharing power
in the provisional government, but must remain the party of extreme
revolutionary opposition."
The advice
to occupy a position which best ensures the possibility of advancing
the revolution pleases us very much indeed. We would only desire that
this piece of good advice should be accompanied by a direct indication
as to how Social-Democracy should further advance the revolution right
now, in the present political situation, in a period of rumours, conjectures,
and talk and schemes about the convocation of the people's representatives.
Can the revolution now be further advanced by those who fail to understand
the danger of the Osvobozhdeniye theory of "compromise' between
the people and the tsar, by those who call a mere 'decision" to
convene a constituent assembly a victory, who do not set themselves
the task of carrying on active propaganda of the idea of the need for
a provisional revolutionary government, or who leave the slogan of a
democratic republic in the background? Such people actually pull the
revolution back, because, as far as practical politics are concerned,
they have stopped at the level of the Osvobozhdeniye stand. What is
the use of their recognising a programme which demands that the autocracy
be replaced by a republic, if in a resolution on tactics that defines
the Party's present and immediate tasks in the period of revolution
they omit the slogan of a struggle for a republic? It is the Osvobozhdeniye
position, the position of the constitutionalist bourgeoisie, that is
now actually characterised by the fact that a decision to convene a
popular constituent assembly is considered a decisive victory, while
a prudent silence is maintained on the subject of a provisional revolutionary
government and a republic! To advance the revolution, to take it beyond
the limits to which the monarchist bourgeoisie advances it, it is necessary
actively to produce, emphasise, and bring into the forefront slogans
that will preclude the "inconsistency" of bourgeois democracy.
At present there are only two such slogans: 1) a provisional revolutionary
government, and 2) a republic, because the slogan of a popular constituent
assembly has been accepted by the monarchist bourgeoisie (see the programme
of the Osvobozhdeniye League) and accepted for the very purpose of devitalising
the revolution, preventing its complete victory, and enabling the big
bourgeoisie to strike a huckster's bargain with tsarism. And now we
see that of the two slogans, which alone are capable of advancing the
revolution, the Conference completely forgot the slogan of a republic,
and plainly put the slogan of a provisional revolutionary government
on a par with the Osvobozhdeniye slogan of a popular constituent assembly,
calling both the one and the other "a decisive victory of the revolution"!!
Indeed,
such is the undoubted fact, which, we are sure, will serve as a landmark
for the future historian of Russian Social-Democracy. The Conference
of Social-Democrats held in May 1905 passed a resolution which contains
fine words about the necessity of advancing the democratic revolution,
but in fact pulls it back and goes no farther than the democratic slogans
of the monarchist bourgeoisie.
The new-Iskra
group likes to accuse us of ignoring the danger of the proletariat becoming
dissolved in bourgeois democracy. We should like to see the person who
would undertake to prove this charge on the basis of the text of the
resolutions passed by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party. Our reply to our opponents is—a Social-Democratic
Party which operates in a bourgeois society cannot take part in politics
without marching, in certain cases, side by side with bourgeois democracy.
The difference between us in this respect is that we march side by side
with the revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie, without merging with
it, whereas you march side by side with the liberal and the monarchist
bourgeoisie, without merging with it either. That is how matters stand.
The tactical
slogans you have formulated in the name of the Conference coincide with
the slogans of the "ConstitutionalDemocratic" Party, i.e.,
the party of the monarchist bourgeoisie; moreover, you have not even
noticed or realised this coincidence, thus actually following in the
wake of the Osvobozhdeniye fraternity.
The tactical
slogans we have formulated in the name of the Third Congress of the
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party coincide with the slogans of
the democratic-revolutionary and republican bourgeoisie. In Russia this
bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie have not yet formed themselves into
a big people's party.1) But only one who is utterly ignorant of what
is now taking place in Russia can doubt that elements of such a party
exist. We intend to guide (if the great Russian revolution makes progress)
not only the proletariat, organised by the Social-Democratic Party,
but also this petty bourgeoisie, which is capable of marching side by
side with us.
Through
its resolution the Conference unconsciously descends to the level of
the liberal and monarchist bourgeoisie. The Party Congress in its resolution
consciously raises to its own level those elements of the revolutionary
democracy that are capable of waging a struggle and not of acting as
brokers.
Such elements
are mostly to be found among the peasants. In classifying the big social
groups according to their political tendencies we can, without danger
of serious error, identify revolutionary and republican democracy with
the mass of the peasants—of course, in the same sense and with
the same reservations and implied conditions as we can identify the
working class with Social-Democracy. In other words, we can also formulate
our conclusions in the following terms: in a revolutionary period the
Conference in its national-wide 2) political slogans unconsciously descends
to the level of the mass of the landlords. The Party Congress in its
national political slogans raises the peasant masses to the revolutionary
level. We challenge anyone who because of this conclusion may accuse
us of evincing a penchant for paradoxes, to refute the proposition that
if we are not strong enough to bring the revolution to a successful
conclusion, if the revolution terminates in a "decisive victory"
in the Osvobozhdentsi sense, i.e., exclusively in the form of a representative
assembly convened by the tsar, which could be called a constituent assembly
only in derision—then this will be a revolution in which the landlord
and big bourgeois element will preponderate. On the other hand, if we
are destined to live through a really great revolution, if history prevents
a "miscarriage" this time, if we are strong enough to carry
the revolution to a successful conclusion, to a decisive victory, not
in the Osvobozhdeniye or the new Iskra sense of the word, then it will
be a revolution in which the peasant and proletarian element will preponderate.
Some people
may, perhaps, interpret our admission that such a preponderance is possible
as a renunciation of the view that the impending revolution will be
bourgeois in character. This is very likely, considering how this concept
is misused in the Iskra. For this reason it will not be at all superfluous
to dwell on this question.
From
what Direction is the Proletariat Threatened with the Danger of Having
its Hands Tied in the Struggle Against the Inconsistent Bourgeoisie?
Marxists
are absolutely convinced of the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution.
What does this mean? It means that the democratic reforms in the political
system and the social and economic reforms, which have become a necessity
for Russia, do not in themselves imply the undermining of capitalism,
the undermining of bourgeois rule; on the contrary, they will, for the
first time, really clear the ground for a wide and rapid, European,
and not Asiatic, development of capitalism; they will, for the first
time, make it possible for the bourgeoisie to rule as a class. The Socialist-Revolutionaries
cannot grasp this idea, for they are ignorant of the rudiments of the
laws of development of commodity and capitalist production; they fail
to see that even the complete success of a peasant insurrection, even
the redistribution of the whole of the land for the benefit of the peasants
and in accordance with their desires ("Black Redistribution"
or something of that kind), will not destroy capitalism at all, but
will, on the contrary, give an impetus to its development and hasten
the class disintegration of the peasantry itself. The failure to grasp
this truth makes the Socialist-Revolutionaries unconscious ideologists
of the petty bourgeoisie. Insistence on this truth is of enormous importance
for Social-Democracy, not only from the theoretical standpoint but also
from the standpoint of practical politics, for from it follows that
the complete class independence of the party of the proletariat in the
present "general democratic" movement is obligatory.
But it
does not at all follow from this that a democratic revolution (bourgeois
in its social and economic substance) is not of enormous interest for
the proletariat. It does not at all follow from this that the democratic
revolution cannot take place in a form advantageous mainly to the big
capitalist, the financial magnate and the "enlightened" landlord,
as well as in a form advantageous to the peasant and to the worker.
The new-Iskraists
thoroughly misunderstand the meaning and significance of the category:
bourgeois revolution. Through their arguments there constantly runs
the idea that a bourgeois revolution is a revolution which can be advantageous
only to the bourgeoisie. And yet nothing is more erroneous than such
an idea. A bourgeois revolution is a revolution which does not go beyond
the limits of the bourgeois, i.e., capitalist, social and economic system.
A bourgeois revolution expresses the need for the development of capitalism,
and far from destroying the foundations of capitalism, it does the opposite,
it broadens and deepens them. This revolution therefore expresses the
interests not only of the working class, but of the entire bourgeoisie
as well. Since the rule of the bourgeoisie over the working class is
inevitable under capitalism, it is quite correct to say that a bourgeois
revolution expresses the interests not so much of the proletariat as
of the bourgeoisie. But it is entirely absurd to think that a bourgeois
revolution does not express the interests of the proletariat at all.
This absurd idea boils down either to the hoary Narodnik theory that
a bourgeois revolution runs counter to the interests of the proletariat,
and that therefore we do not need bourgeois political liberty; or to
anarchism, which rejects all participation of the proletariat in bourgeois
politics, in a bourgeois revolution and in bourgeois parliamentarism.
From the standpoint of theory, this idea disregards the elementary propositions
of Marxism concerning the inevitability of capitalist development where
commodity production exists. Marxism teaches that a society which is
based on commodity production, and which has commercial intercourse
with civilised capitalist nations, at a certain stage of its development,
itself, inevitably takes the road of capitalism. Marxism has irrevocably
broken with the ravings of the Narodniks and the anarchists to the effect
that Russia, for instance, can avoid capitalist development, jump out
of capitalism, or skip over it and proceed along some path other than
the path of the class struggle on the basis and within the framework
of this same capitalism. All these principles of Marxism have been proved
and explained over and over again in minute detail in general and with
regard to Russia in particular. And from these principles it follows
that the idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything
save the further development of capitalism is reactionary. In countries
like Russia, the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as
from the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is
therefore decidedly interested in the broadest, freest and most rapid
development of capitalism. The removal of all the remnants of the old
order which are hampering the broad, free and rapid development of capitalism
is of decided advantage to the working class. The bourgeois revolution
is precisely a revolution that most resolutely sweeps away the survivals
of the past, the remnants of serfdom (which include not only autocracy
but monarchy as well) and most fully guarantees the broadest, freest
and most rapid development of capitalism.
That is
why a bourgeois revolution is in the highest degree advantageous to
the proletariat. A bourgeois revolution is absolutely necessary in the
interests of the proletariat. The more complete and determined, the
more consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more assured will be the
proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie for Socialism. Only those
who are ignorant of the rudiments of scientific Socialism can regard
this conclusion as new or strange, paradoxical. And from this conclusion,
among other things, follows the thesis that, in a certain sense, a bourgeois
revolution is more advantageous to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie.
This thesis is unquestionably correct in the following sense: it is
to the advantage of the bourgeoisie to rely on certain remnants of the
past as against the proletariat, for instance, on the monarchy, the
standing army, etc. It is to the advantage of the bourgeoisie if the
bourgeois revolution does not too resolutely sweep away all the remnants
of the past, but leaves some of them, i.e., if this revolution is not
fully consistent, if it is not complete and if it is not determined
and relentless. Social-Democrats often express this idea somewhat differently
by stating that the bourgeoisie betrays its own self, that the bourgeoisie
betrays the cause of liberty, that the bourgeoisie is incapable of being
consistently democratic. It is of greater advantage to the bourgeoisie
if the necessary changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy take
place more slowly, more gradually, more cautiously, less resolutely,
by means of reforms and not by means of revolution; if these changes
spare the "venerable" institutions of serfdom (such as the
monarchy) as much as possible; if these changes develop as little as
possible the independent revolutionary activity, initiative and energy
of the common people, i.e., the peasantry and especially the workers,
for otherwise it will be easier for the workers, as the French say,
"to hitch the rifle from one shoulder to the other," i.e.,
to turn against the bourgeoisie the guns which the bourgeois revolution
will place in their hands, the liberty which the revolution will bring,
the democratic institutions which will spring up on the ground that
is cleared of serfdom.
On the
other hand, it is more advantageous for the working class if the necessary
changes in the direction of bourgeois democracy take place by way of
revolution and not by way of reform; for the way of reform is the way
of delay, of procrastination, of the painfully slow decomposition of
the putrid parts of the national organism. It is the proletariat and
the peasantry that suffer first of all and most of all from their putrefaction.
The revolutionary way is the way of quick amputation, which is the least
painful to the proletariat, the way of the direct removal of the decomposing
parts, the way of fewest concessions to and least consideration for
the monarchy and the disgusting, vile, rotten and contaminating institutions
which go with it.
So it is
not only because of the censorship, not only "for fear of the Jews,"
that our bourgeois-liberal press deplores the possibility of a revolutionary
way, is afraid of revolution, tries to frighten the tsar with the bogey
of revolution, is anxious to avoid revolution, grovels and toadies for
the sake of miserable reforms as a basis for a reformist way. This standpoint
is shared not only by the Russkiye Vedomosti, Syn Otechestva, Nasha
Zhizn and Nashi Dni, but also by the illegal, uncensored Osvobozhdeniye.
The very position the bourgeoisie occupies as a class in capitalist
society inevitably causes it to be inconsistent in a democratic revolution.
The very position the proletariat occupies as a class compels it to
be consistently democratic. The bourgeoisie looks backward, fearing
democratic progress, which threatens to strengthen the proletariat.
The proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains, but with the aid
of democracy it has the whole world to gain. That is why the more consistent
the bourgeois revolution is in its democratic changes, the less will
it limit itself to what is of advantage exclusively to the bourgeoisie.
The more consistent the bourgeois revolution, the more does it guarantee
the proletariat and the peasantry the benefits accruing from the democratic
revolution.
Marxism
teaches the proletarian not to keep aloof from the bourgeois revolution,
not to be indifferent to it, not to allow the leadership of the revolution
to be assumed by the bourgeoisie but, on the contrary, to take a most
energetic part in it, to fight most resolutely for consistent proletarian
democracy, for carrying the revolution to its conclusion. We cannot
jump out of the bourgeois-democratic boundaries of the Russian revolution,
but we can vastly extend these boundaries, and within these boundaries
we can and must fight for the interests of the proletariat, for its
immediate needs and for the conditions that will make it possible to
prepare its forces for the future complete victory. There is bourgeois
democracy and bourgeois democracy. The Zemstvo monarchist who favours
an upper chamber, and who "asks" for universal suffrage while
secretly, on the sly, striking a bargain with tsarism for a curtailed
constitution, is also a bourgeois-democrat. And the peasant who is fighting,
arms in hand, against the landlords and the government officials and
with a "naïve republicanism" proposes "to send the
tsar packing" is also a bourgeois-democrat. There are bourgeois-democratic
regimes like the one in Germany and also in England, like the one in
Austria and also like those in America or Switzerland. He would be a
fine Marxist indeed, who in a period of democratic revolution failed
to see the difference between the degrees of democracy, the difference
of its various forms and confined himself to "clever" remarks
to the effect that, after all, this is "a bourgeois revolution,"
the fruits of a "bourgeois revolution."
Our new-Iskraists
are just such clever fellows flaunting their shortsightedness. They
confine themselves to disquisitions on the bourgeois character of the
revolution just when and where it is necessary to be able to draw a
distinction between republican-revolutionary and monarchist-liberal
bourgeois democracy, to say nothing of the distinction between inconsistent
bourgeois democratism and consistent proletarian democratism. They are
satisfied—as if they had really become Iike the "man in the
muffler"[A] —to converse dolefully about a "process
of mutual struggle of antagonistic classes," when the question
is one of giving democratic leadership in the present revolution, of
emphasising progressive democratic slogans as distinguished from the
treacherous slogans of Mr. Struve and Co., of bluntly and straight forwardly
stating the immediate aims of the really revolutionary struggle of the
proletariat and the peasantry, as distinguished from the liberal haggling
of the landlords and factory owners. Such now is the gist of the matter,
which you, gentlemen, have missed: will our revolution result in a real,
immense victory, or merely in a wretched deal, will it go so far as
the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the
peasantry, or will it "peter out" in a liberal constitution
à la Shipov?
At first
sight it may appear that in raising this question we are deviating entirely
from our subject. But this may appear to be so only at first sight.
As a matter of fact, it is precisely this question that lies at the
root of the difference in principle which has already become clearly
marked between the Social-Democratic tactics of the Third Congress of
the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the tactics initiated
by the Conference of the new Iskra supporters. The latter have already
taken not two but three steps back, resurrecting the mistakes of Economism
in solving problems that are incomparably more complex, more important
and more vital to the workers' party, viz., questions of its tactics
in time of revolution. That is why we must analyse the question we have
raised with all due attention.
The above-quoted
section of the new-Iskraists resolution which we have quoted above points
to the danger of Social-Democracy tying its hands in the struggle against
the inconsistent policy of the bourgeoisie, of its becoming dissolved
in bourgeois democracy. The idea of this danger runs like a thread through
all the literature typical of the new Iskra, it is the real pivot of
the principle involved in our Party split (ever since the elements of
squabbling in this split were wholly eclipsed by the elements of a turn
towards Economism). And without any equivocation we admit that this
danger really exists, that just at the present time, at the height of
the Russian revolution, this danger has become particularly grave. The
pressing and extremely responsible duty that devolves on all of us theoreticians
or—as I should prefer to say of myself— publicists of Social-Democracy,
is to find out from what direction this danger actually threatens. For
the source of our disagreement is not a dispute as to whether such a
danger exists, but the dispute as to whether it is caused by the so-called
khvostism of the "Minority" or the so-called revolutionism
of the "Majority."
To remove
all misinterpretations and misunderstandings, let us first of all note
that the danger to which we are referring lies not in the subjective,
but in the objective aspect of the matter, not in the formal position
which Social-Democracy will take in the struggle, but in the material
outcome of the entire present revolutionary struggle. The question is
not whether this or that Social-Democratic group will want to dissolve
in bourgeois democracy or whether they are conscious of the fact that
they are merging. Nobody suggests that. We do not suspect any Social-Democrat
of harbouring such a desire, and this is not at all a question of desires.
Nor is it a question of whether this or that Social-Democratic group
will formally retain its separate identity, individuality and independence
of bourgeois democracy throughout the course of the revolution. They
may not only proclaim such "independence" but even retain
it formally, and yet it may turn out that their hands will nonetheless
be tied in the struggle against the inconsistency of the bourgeoisie.
The final political result of the revolution may prove to be that, in
spite of the formal "independence" of Social-Democracy, in
spite of its complete organisational individuality as a separate party,
it will in fact not be independent, it will not be able to put the imprint
of its proletarian independence on the course of events, will prove
so weak that, on the whole and in the last analysis, its "dissolving"
in the bourgeois democracy will nonetheless be a historical fact.
That is
what constitutes the real danger. Now let us see from what direction
the danger threatens: from the fact that Social-Democracy as represented
by the new Iskra is deviating to the Right—as we believe; or from
the fact that Social-Democracy as represented by the "Majority,"
the Vperyod, etc., is deviating to the Left—as the new-Iskraists
believe.
The answer
to this question, as we have pointed out, depends on the objective combination
of the actions of the various social forces. The character of these
forces has been defined theoretically by the Marxian analysis of Russian
life; at the present time it is being defined in practice by the open
action of groups and classes in the course of the revolution. Thus,
the entire theoretical analysis made by the Marxists long before the
period we are now passing through, as well as all the practical observations
of the development of revolutionary events, show that from the standpoint
of objective conditions there are two possible courses and outcomes
of the revolution in Russia. A change in the economic and political
system in Russia along bourgeois-democratic lines is inevitable and
unavoidable. No power on earth can prevent such a change. But the combined
actions of the existing forces which are effecting that change may result
in one of two things, may bring about one of two forms of that change.
Either the result will be a "decisive victory of the revolution
over tsarism," or the forces will be inadequate for a decisive
victory and the matter will end in a deal between tsarism and the most
"inconsistent" and most "self-seeking" elements
of the bourgeoisie. By and large all the infinite variety of detail
and combinations, which no one is able to foresee, lead to one or the
other.
Let us
now consider these two outcomes, first, from the standpoint of their
social significance and, secondly, from the standpoint of the position
of Social-Democracy (its "dissolving" or "having its
hands tied") in one or the other case.
What
is a "decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism"?
We have
already seen that in using this expression the new-Iskraists fail to
grasp even its immediate political significance. Still less do they
seem to understand the class essence of this concept. Surely, we Marxists
must not under any circumstances allow ourselves to be deluded by words
such as "revolution" or "the great Russian revolution,"
as do many revolutionary democrats (of the Gapon type). We must be perfectly
clear in our minds as to what real social forces are opposed to "tsarism"
(which is a real force, perfectly intelligible to all) and are capable
of gaining a "decisive victory" over it. Such a force cannot
be the big bourgeoisie, the landlords, the factory owners, "society"
which follows the lead of the Osvobozhdentsi. We see that these do not
even want a decisive victory. We know that owing to their class position
they are incapable of waging a decisive struggle against tsarism; they
are too heavily fettered by private property, capital and land to enter
into a decisive struggle. They need tsarism with its bureaucratic, police
and military forces for use against the proletariat and the peasantry
too much to be able to strive for its destruction. No, the only force
capable of gaining "a decisive victory over tsarism," is the
people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main,
big forces and distribute the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie (also
part of "the people") between the two. "A decisive victory
of the revolution over tsarism" is the revolutionary-democratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Our new-Iskraists
cannot escape from this conclusion, which Vperyod pointed out long ago.
No one else is capable of gaining a decisive victory over tsarism.
And such
a victory will be precisely a dictatorship, i.e., it must inevitably
rely on military force, on the arming of the masses, on an insurrection,
and not on institutions of one kind or another, established in a "lawful"
or "peaceful" way. It can be only a dictatorship, for the
realisation of the changes which are urgently and absolutely indispensable
for the proletariat and the peasantry will call forth the desperate
resistance of the landlords, of the big bourgeoisie and of tsarism.
Without a dictatorship it is impossible to break down that resistance
and to repel the counterrevolutionary attempts. But of course it will
be a democratic, not a socialist dictatorship. It will not be able (without
a series of intermediary stages of revolutionary development) to affect
the foundations of capitalism. At best it may bring about a radical
redistribution of landed property in favour of the peasantry, establish
consistent and full democracy including the formation of a republic,
eradicate all the oppressive features of Asiatic bondage, not only in
village but also in factory life, lay the foundation for a thorough
improvement in the position of the workers and for a rise in their standard
of living, and—last but not least—carry the revolutionary
conflagration into Europe. Such a victory will by no means as yet transform
our bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution; the democratic
revolution will not directly overstep the bounds of bourgeois social
and economic relationships; nevertheless, the significance of such a
victory for the future development of Russia and of the whole world
will be immense. Nothing will raise the revolutionary energy of the
world proletariat so much, nothing will shorten the path leading to
its complete victory to such an extent, as this decisive victory of
the revolution that has now started in Russia.
How far
such a victory is probable, is another question. We are not in the least
inclined to be unreasonably optimistic on that score, we do not for
a moment forget the immense difficulties of this task, but since we
are out to fight we must desire victory and be able to point out the
right road to it. Tendencies capable of leading to such a victory undoubtedly
exist. True, our, Social-Democratic, influence on the masses of the
proletariat is as yet very, very inadequate; the revolutionary influence
on the mass of the peasantry is altogether insignificant; the proletariat,
and especially the peasantry, are still frightfully scattered, backward
and ignorant. But revolution unites quickly and enlightens quickly.
Every step in its development rouses the masses and attracts them with
irresistible force to the side of the revolutionary program, as the
only program that fully and consistently expresses their real and vital
interests.
According
to a law of mechanics, every action produces an equal reaction. In history
also the destructive force of a revolution is to a considerable degree
dependent on how strong and protracted the suppression of the striving
for liberty had been, and how profound the contradiction between the
antediluvian "superstructure" and the living forces of the
present epoch. The international political situation, too, is in many
respects shaping itself in a way most advantageous for the Russian revolution.
The insurrection of the workers and peasants has already commenced;
it is sporadic, spontaneous, weak, but it unquestionably and undoubtedly
proves the existence of forces capable of waging a decisive struggle
and marching towards a decisive victory.
If these
forces prove inadequate, tsarism will have time to conclude the deal
which is already being prepared on two sides, by Messrs. the Bulygins
on the one side, and Messrs. the Struves, on the other. Then the whole
thing will end in a curtailed constitution, or, if the worst comes to
the worst, even in a travesty of a constitution. This will also be a
"bourgeois revolution," but it will be a miscarriage, a premature
birth, a mongrel. Social-Democracy entertains no illusions on that score,
it knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie, it will not lose
heart or abandon its persistent, patient, sustained work of giving the
proletariat class training even in the most drab, humdrum days of bourgeois-constitutional,
"Shipov" bliss. Such an outcome would be more or less similar
to the outcome of almost all the democratic revolutions in Europe during
the nineteenth century, and our Party development would then proceed
along the difficult, hard, long, but familiar and beaten track.
The question
now arises: in which of these two possible outcomes will Social-Democracy
find its hands actually tied in the fight against the inconsistent and
self-seeking bourgeoisie, find itself actually "dissolved,"
or almost so, in bourgeois democracy?
It is sufficient
to put this question clearly to have not a moment's difficulty in answering
it.
If the
bourgeoisie succeeds in frustrating the Russian revolution by coming
to terms with tsarism, Social-Democracy will find its hands actually
tied in the fight against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; Social-Democracy
will find itself dissolved "in bourgeois democracy" in the
sense that the proletariat will not succeed in putting its clear imprint
on the revolution, will not succeed in settling accounts with tsarism
in the proletarian or, as Marx once said, "in the plebeian"
way.
If the
revolution gains a decisive victory—then we shall settle accounts
with tsarism in the Jacobin, or, if you like, in the plebeian way. "The
whole French terrorism," wrote Marx in 1848 in the famous Neue
Rheinische Zeitung, "was nothing but a plebeian manner of settling
accounts with the enemies of the bourgeoisie, with absolutism, feudalism
and philistinism" (see Marx, Nachlass, Mehring's edition, Volume
III, p. 211).[B] Have those people who, in a period of a democratic
revolution, try to frighten the Social-Democratic workers in Russia
with the bogey of "Jacobinism" ever stopped to think of the
significance of these words of Marx?
The Girondists
of contemporary Russian Social-Democracy, the new Iskra-ists, do not
merge with the Osvobozhdentsi, but in point of fact they, by reason
of the nature of their slogans, follow at the tail of the latter. And
the Osvobozhdentsi, i.e., the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie,
wish to settle accounts with the autocracy gently, in a reformist way,
in a yielding manner, so as not to offend the aristocracy, the nobles,
the Court—cautiously, without breaking anything—kindly and
politely, as befits gentlemen in white gloves (like the ones Mr. Petrunkevich
borrowed from a bashi-bazouk to wear at the reception of "representatives
of the people"[?] held by Nicholas the Bloody [C]. See Proletary,
No. 5).
The Jacobins
of contemporary Social-Democracy—the Bolsheviks, the Vperyodovtsi,
Syezdovtsi, Proletartsi [D], or whatever we may call them—wish
by their slogans to raise the revolutionary and republican petty bourgeoisie,
and especially the peasantry, to the level of the consistent democratism
of the proletariat, which fully retains its individuality as a class.
They want the people, i.e., the proletariat and the peasantry, to settle
accounts with the monarchy and the aristocracy in the "plebeian
way," ruthlessly destroying the enemies of liberty, crushing their
resistance by force, making no concessions whatever to the accursed
heritage of serfdom, of Asiatic barbarism and human degradation.
This, of
course, does not mean that we necessarily propose to imitate the Jacobins
of 1793, to adopt their views, program, slogans and methods of action.
Nothing of the kind. Our program is not an old one, it is a new one—the
minimum program of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. We have
a new slogan: the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat
and the peasantry. We shall also have, if we live to see a real victory
of the revolution, new methods of action, in harmony with the nature
and aims of the working-class party that is striving for a complete
socialist revolution. By our comparison we merely want to explain that
the representatives of the progressive class of the twentieth century,
of the proletariat, i.e., the Social-Democrats, are divided into two
wings (the opportunist and the revolutionary) similar to those into
which the representatives of the progressive class of the eighteenth
century, the bourgeoisie, were divided, i.e., the Girondists and the
Jacobins.
Only in
the event of a complete victory of the democratic revolution will the
proletariat have its hands free in the struggle against the inconsistent
bourgeoisie, only in that event will it not become "dissolved"
in bourgeois democracy, but will leave its proletarian or rather proletarian-peasant
imprint on the whole revolution.
In a word,
in order to avoid finding itself with its hands tied in the struggle
against the inconsistent bourgeois democrats, the proletariat must be
sufficiently class conscious and strong to rouse the peasantry to revolutionary
consciousness, to direct its attack, and thereby to pursue the line
of consistent proletarian democratism independently.
This is
how matters stand with regard to the question, so ineptly dealth with
by the new Iskragroup, of the danger of our hands being tied in the
struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will
always be inconsistent. There is nothing more naïve and futile
than attempts to set forth conditions and points, which if satisfied,
would enable us to consider that the bourgeois democrat is a sincere
friend of the people. Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter
for democracy. It may become a victorious fighter for democracy only
if the peasant masses join its revolutionary struggle. If the proletariat
is not strong enough for this, the bourgeoisie will be at the head of
the democratic revolution and will impart to it an inconsistent and
self-seeking nature. Nothing short of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship
of the proletariat and the peasantry can prevent this.
Thus, we
arrive at the indubitable conclusion that it is precisely the new Iskra
tactics, by its objective significance, that are playing into the hands
of the bourgeois democrats. Preaching organisational diffusion that
goes to the length of plebiscites, the principle of compromise and the
divorcement of Party literature from the Party, belittling the aims
of armed insurrection, confusing the popular political slogans of the
revolutionary proletariat with those of the monarchist bourgeoisie,
distorting the requisites for a "decisive victory of the revolution
over tsarism"—all this taken together constitutes that very
policy of khvostism in a revolutionary period which perplexes the proletariat,
disorganises it, confuses its understanding and belittles the tactics
of Social-Democracy, instead of pointing out the only way to victory
and of rallying all the revolutionary and republican elements of the
people to the proletariat's slogan.
To bear
out this conclusion, reached by us through analysis of the resolution,
let us approach this same question from other angles. Let us see, first,
how in the Georgian Sotsial-Demoktat a naïve and outspoken Menshevik
illustrates the new-Iskra. Secondly, let us see who is actually making
use of the new Iskra slogans in the present political situation.
The
Tactics of "Eliminating The Conservatives from the Government"
The article
in the organ of the Tiflis Menshevik "Committee" (Sotsial-Demokrat,
No. 1) to which we have just referred is entitled "The Zemsky Sobor
and Our Tactics." Its author has not yet entirely forgotten our
program; he advances the slogan of a republic, but this is how he discusses
tactics:
"It
is possible to point to two ways of achieving this goal" (a republic):
"either completely ignore the Zemsky Sobor that is being convened
by the government and defeat the government by force of arms, form a
revolutionary government and convene a constituent assembly, or declare
the Zemsky Sobor the centre of our actions, influencing its composition
and activity by force of arms and either forcibly compelling it to declare
itself a constituent assembly or convening a constituent assembly through
it. These two tactics differ very sharply from one another. Let us see
which of them is more advantageous to us."
This is
how the Russian new-Iskraists set forth the ideas that were subsequently
incorporated in the resolution we have analysed. Note that this was
written before the battle of Tsushima, when the Bulygin "scheme"
had not yet seen the light of the day. Even the liberals were losing
patience and expressing their lack of confidence in the pages of the
legal press; but a new Iskra-ist Social-Democrat proved more credulous
than the liberals. He declares that the Zemsky Sobor "is being
convened" and trusts the tsar so much that he proposes to make
this as yet non-existent Zemsky Sobor (or, possibly, "State Duma"
or "Advisory Legislative Assembly"?) the centre of our actions.
Being more outspoken and straightforward than the authors of the resolution
adopted at the Conference, our Tiflisian does not put the two "tactics"
(which he expounds with inimitable naïveté) on a par but
declares that the second is more "advantageous." Just listen:
"The
first tactics. As you know, the coming revolution is a bourgeois revolution,
i.e., its purpose is to effect such changes in the present system as
are of interest not only to the proletariat but to the whole of bourgeois
society. All classes are opposed to the government, even the capitalists
themselves. The militant proletariat and the militant bourgeoisie are
in a certain sense marching together and jointly attacking the autocracy
from different sides. The government is completely isolated and lacks
public sympathy. For this reason it is very easy to destroy it. The
Russian proletariat as a whole is not yet sufficiently class conscious
and organised to be able to carry out the revolution by itself. And
even if it were able to do so, it would carry through a proletarian
(socialist) revolution and not a bourgeois revolution. Hence, it is
in our interest that the government remain without allies, that it be
unable to disunite the opposition, unable to ally the bourgeoisie to
itself and leave the proletariat isolated. . . ."
So, it
is in the interests of the proletariat that the tsarist government shall
not be able to disunite the bourgeoisie and the proletariat! Is it not
by mistake that this Georgian organ is called Sotsial-Demokrat instead
of Osvobozhdeniye? And note its peerless philosophy of democratic revolution!
Is it not obvious that this poor Tiflisian is hopelessly confused by
the pedantic khvostist interpretation of the concept "bourgeois
revolution"? He discusses the question of the possible isolation
of the proletariat in a democratic revolution and forgets . . . forgets
about a trifle . . . about the peasantry! of the possible allies of
the proletariat he knows and favours the landowning Zemstvo-ists and
is not aware of the peasants. And this in the Caucasus! Well, were we
not right when we said that by its method of reasoning the new Iskra
was sinking to the level of the monarchist bourgeoisie instead of raising
the revolutionary peasantry to the position of our ally?
".
. . Otherwise the defeat of the proletariat and the victory of the government
is inevitable. This is just what the autocracy is striving for. In its
Zemsky Sobor it will undoubtedly attract to its side the representatives
of the nobility, of the Zemstvos, the cities, the universities and similar
bourgeois institutions. It will try to appease them with petty concessions
and thereby reconcile them to itself. Strengthened in this way, it will
direct all its blows against the working people who will have been isolated.
It is our duty to prevent such an unfortunate outcome. But can this
be done of the first method? Let us assume that we paid no attention
whatever to the Zemsky Sobor, but started to prepare for insurrection
ourselves, and one fine day came out in the streets armed and ready
for battle. The result would be that we would be confronted not with
one but with two enemies: the government and the Zemsky Sobor. While
we were preparing, they would manage to come to terms, enter into an
agreement with one another, draw up a constitution advantageous to themselves
and divide power between them. These tactics are of direct advantage
to the government, and we must reject them in the most energetic fashion.
. . ."
Now this
is frank! We must resolutely reject the "tactics" of preparing
an insurrection because "meanwhile" the government would come
to terms with the bourgeoisie! Can one find in the old literature of
the most rabid "Economism" anything that would even approximate
such a disgrace to revolutionary Social-Democracy? That insurrections
and outbreaks of workers and peasants are occurring, first in one place
and then in another, is a fact. The Zemsky Sobor, however, is a Bulygin
promise. And the Sotsial-Demokrat of the city of Tiflis decides: to
reject the tactics of preparing an insurrection and to wait for a "centre
of influence"—the Zemsky Sobor. . . .
".
. . The second tactics, on the contrary, consist in placing the Zemsky
Sobor under our surveillance, in not giving it the opportunity to act
according to its own will and enter into an agreement with the government.
"We
support the Zemsky Sobor to the extent that it fights the autocracy,
and we fight it in those cases when it becomes reconciled with the autocracy.
By energetic interference and force we shall cause a split among the
deputies, rally the radicals to our side, eliminate the conservatives
from the government and thus put the whole Zemsky Sobor on the path
of revolution. Thanks to such tactics the government will always remain
isolated, the opposition strong and the establishment of a democratic
system will thereby be facilitated."
Well, well!
Let anyone now say that we exaggerate the new Iskra-ists' turn to the
most vulgar semblance of Economism. This is positively like the famous
powder for exterminating flies: you catch the fly, sprinkle it with
the powder and the fly will die. Split the deputies of the Zemsky Sobor
by force, "eliminate the conservatives from the government"—and
the whole Zemsky Sobor will take the path of revolution. . . . No "Jacobin"
armed insurrection of any sort, but just like that, in genteel, almost
parliamentary fashion, "influencing" the members of the Zemsky
Sobor.
Poor Russia!
It has been said that she always wears the old-fashioned bonnets that
Europe discards. We have no parliament as yet, even Bulygin has not
yet promised one, but we have any amount of parliamentary cretinism.
".
. . How should this interference be effected? First of all, we shall
demand that the Zemsky Sobor be convened on the basis of universal and
equal suffrage, direct elections and secret ballot. Simultaneously with
the announcement of this method of election, complete freedom to carry
on the election campaign, i.e., freedom of assembly, of speech and of
the press, the inviolability of the electors and the candidates and
the release of all political prisoners must be made law. The elections
themselves must be fixed as late as possible so that we have sufficient
time to inform and prepare the people. And since the drafting of the
regulations governing the convocation of the Sobor has been entrusted
to a commission headed by Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, we should
also exert pressure on this commission and on its members. If the Bulygin
Commission refuses to satisfy our demands nd grants suffrage only to
property owners, then we must interfere in these elections and, by revolutionary
means, force the voters to elect progressive candidates and in the Zemsky
Sobor demand a constituent assembly. Finally, we must, by all possible
measures: demonstrations, strikes and insurrection if need be, compel
the Zemsky Sobor to convene a constituent assembly or declare itself
to be such. The armed proletariat must constitute itself the defender
of the constituent assembly, and both together will march forward to
a democratic republic.
"Such
are the Social-Democratic tactics, and they alone will secure us victory."
Let not
the reader imagine that this incredible nonsense is simply a maiden
attempt at writing on the part of some new Iskra adherent with no authority
or influence. No, this is what is stated in the organ of an entire committee
of new Iskra-ists, the Tiflis Committee. More than that. This nonsense
has been openly endorsed by the "Iskra" in No. 100 of which
we read the following about that issue of the Sotsial-Demokrat :
"The
first issue is edited in a lively and talented manner. The experienced
hand of a capable editor and writer is perceptible. . . . It may be
said with all confidence that the newspaper will brilliantly carry out
the task it has set itself."
Yes! If
that task is clearly to show all and sundry the utter ideological decay
of new Iskra, then it has indeed been carried out "brilliantly."
No one could have expressed the new Iskra degradation to liberal bourgeois
opportunism in a more "lively, talented and capable" manner.
Osvobozhdeniyeism
and New Iskra Trends
Let us
now proceed to another striking confirmation of the political meaning
of new-Iskra trend.
In a splendid,
remarkable and most instructive article, entitled "How to Find
Oneself" (Osvobozhdeniye, No. 71), Mr. Struve wages war against
the "programmatic revolutionism" of our extreme parties. Mr.
Struve is particularly displeased with me personally. Mr. Struve could
not please me more: I could not wish for a better ally in the fight
against the renascent Economism of the new-Iskraists and the utter lack
of principle displayed by the "Socialist-Revolutionaries."
On some other occasion we shall relate how Mr. Struve and the Osvobozhdeniye
proved in practice how utterly reactionary are the "amendments"
to Marxism made in the draft program of the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
We have already repeatedly spoken about how Mr. Struve rendered me honest,
faithful and real service every time he approved of the new-Iskraists
in principle and we shall say so once more now.
Mr. Struve's
article contains a number of very interesting statements, which we can
note here only in passing. He intends "to create Russian democracy
by relying on class collaboration and not on class struggle," in
which case "the socially privileged intelligentsia" (something
in the nature of the "cultured nobility" to which Mr. Struve
makes obeisance with the grace of a truly high-society . . . lackey)
will bring the weight of its "social position" (the weight
of its moneybags) to this "non-class" party. Mr. Struve expresses
the desire to show the youth the worthlessness "of the hackneyed
radical opinion that the bourgeoisie has become frightened and has sold
out the proletariat and the cause of liberty." (We welcome this
desire with all our heart. Nothing will confirm the correctness of this
Marxian "hackneyed" opinion better than a war waged against
it by Mr. Struve. Please, Mr. Struve, don't pigeonhole this splendid
plan of yours!)
For the
purposes of our subject it is important to note the practical slogans
against which this politically sensitive representative of the Russian
bourgeoisie, who is so responsive to the slightest change in the weather,
is fighting at the present time. First, he is fighting against the slogan
of republicanism. Mr. Struve is firmly convinced that this slogan is
"incomprehensible and foreign to the masses of the people"
(he forgets to add: comprehensible, but not of advantage to the bourgeoisie!).
We should like to see what reply Mr. Struve would get from the workers
in our study circles and at our mass meetings! Or are the workers not
the people? And the peasants? They are given to what Mr. Struve calls
"naïve republicanism" ("to kick out the tsar")—but
the liberal bourgeoisie believes that naïve republicanism will
be replaced not by enlightened republicanism but by enlightened monarchism!
Ça dépend, Mr. Struve; it will depend on circumstances.
Neither tsarism nor the bourgeoisie can help opposing a radical improvement
in the condition of the peasantry at the expense of the landed estates,
whereas the working class cannot help assisting the peasantry in this
respect.
Secondly,
Mr. Struve assures us that "in a civil war the attacking party
always proves to be in the wrong." This idea verges closely on
the above-mentioned trends of the new Iskra ideas. We will not say,
of course, that in civil war it is always advantageous to attack; no,
sometimes defensive tactics are obligatory for a time. But to apply
a proposition like the one Mr. Struve has made to Russia in 1905 means
precisely displaying a little of the "hackneyed radical opinion"
("the bourgeoisie takes fright and betrays the cause of liberty").
Whoever now refuses to attack the autocracy and reaction, whoever is
not making preparations for such an attack, whoever is not advocating
it, takes the name of adherent of the revolution in vain.
Mr. Struve
condemns the slogans: "secrecy" and "rioting" (a
riot being "an insurrection in miniature"). Mr. Struve spurns
both the one and the other—and he does so from the standpoint
of "approaching the masses." We should like to ask Mr. Struve
whether he can point to any passage in, for instance, What Is To Be
Done?—the work of an extreme revolutionary from his standpoint—which
advocates rioting. As regards "secrecy" is there really much
difference between, for example, us and Mr. Struve? Are we not both
working on "illegal" newspapers which are being smuggled into
Russia "secretly" and which serve the "secret" groups
of either the Osvobozhdeniye League or the R.S.D.L.P.? Our workers'
mass meetings are often held "secretly" —that sin does
exist. But what about the meetings of the gentlemen of the Osvobozhdeniye
League? Is there any reason why you should brag, Mr. Struve, and look
down upon the despised partisans of despised secrecy?
True, the
supplying of arms to the workers demands strict secrecy. On this point
Mr. Struve is rather more outspoken. Just listen: "As regards armed
insurrection, or a revolution in the technical sense, only mass propaganda
in favour of a democratic program can create the social-psychological
conditions for a general armed insurrection. Thus, even from the point
of view that an armed insurrection is the inevitable consummation of
the present struggle for emancipation—a view I do not share—the
permeation of the masses with ideas of democratic reform is a most fundamental
and most necessary task."
Mr. Struve
tries to evade the issue. He speaks of the inevitability of an insurrection
instead of speaking about its necessity for the victory of the revolution.
The insurrection—unprepared, spontaneous, sporadic—has already
begun. No one can positively vouch that it will develop into an entire
and integral popular armed insurrection, for that depends on the state
of the revolutionary forces (which can be fully gauged only in the course
of the struggle itself), on the behaviour of the government and the
bourgeoisie, and on a number of other circumstances which it is impossible
to estimate exactly. There is no point in speaking about inevitability,
in the sense of absolute certainty with regard to some definite event,
as Mr. Struve does. What you must discuss, if you want to be a partisan
of the revolution is whether insurrection is necessary for the victory
of the revolution, whether it is necessary to proclaim it vigorously,
to advocate and make immediate and energetic preparations for it. Mr.
Struve cannot fail to understand this difference: he does not, for instance,
obscure the question of the necessity of universal suffrage—which
is indisputable for a democrat—by raising the question of whether
its attainment is inevitable in the course of the present revolution—which
is debatable and of no urgency for people engaged in political activity.
By evading the issue of the necessity of an insurrection, Mr. Struve
expresses the inner most essence of the political position of the liberal
bourgeoisie. In the first place, the bourgeoisie would prefer to come
to terms with the autocracy rather than crush it; secondly, the bourgeoisie
in any case thrusts the armed struggle upon the shoulders of the workers.
This is the real meaning of Mr. Struve's evasiveness. That is why he
backs out of the question of the necessity of an insurrection towards
the question of the "social-psychological conditions" for
it, of preliminary "propaganda." Just as the bourgeois windbags
in the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848 engaged in drawing up resolutions,
declarations and decisions, in "mass propaganda" and in preparing
the "social-psychological conditions" at a time when it was
a matter of repelling the armed force of the government, when the movement
"led to the necessity" for an armed struggle, when verbal
persuasion alone (which is a hundredfold necessary during the preparatory
period) became banal, bourgeois inactivity and cowardice—so also
Mr. Struve evades the question of insurrection, screening himself behind
phrases. Mr. Struve vividly shows us what many Social-Democrats stubbornly
fail to see, namely, that a revolutionary period differs from ordinary,
everyday preparatory periods in history in that the temper, excitement
and convictions of the masses must and do reveal themselves in action.
Vulgar
revolutionism fails to see that the word is also a deed; this proposition
is indisputable when applied to history generally, or to those periods
of history when no open political mass actions take place, and when
they can not be replaced or artificially evoked by putsches of any sort.
Khvostist revolutionaries fail to understand that—when a revolutionary
period has started, when the old "superstructure" has cracked
from top to bottom, when open political action on the part of the classes
and masses who are creating a new superstructure for themselves has
become a fact, when civil war has begun—then, to confine oneself
to "words" as of old, and fail to advance the direct slogan
to pass to "deeds," still to try avoid deeds by pleading the
need for "psychological conditions" and "propaganda"
in general, is apathy, lifelessness, pedantry, or else betrayal of the
revolution and treachery to it. The Frankfurt windbags of the democratic
bourgeoisie are a memorable historical example of just such treachery,
or of just such pedantic stupidity.
Would you
like an explanation of this difference between vulgar revolutionism
and the khvostism of revolutionaries by an example taken from the history
of the Social Democratic movement in Russia? We shall give you such
an explanation. Call to mind the years 1901 and 1902, which are so recent
but which already seem ancient history to us today. Demonstrations had
begun. The protagonists of vulgar revolutionism raised a cry about "storming"
(Rabocheye Dyelo) "bloodthirsty leaflets" were issued (of
Berlin origin, if my memory does not fail me), attacks were made on
the "literature writing" and armchair nature of the idea of
conducting agitation on a national scale through a newspaper (Nadezhdin).[B]
On the other hand, the khvostism of revolutionaries was revealed in
preaching that "the economic struggle is the best means of political
agitation." What was the attitude of the revolutionary Social-Democrats?
They attacked both these trends. They condemned flash in-the-pan methods
and the cries about storming, for it was or should have been obvious
to all that open mass action was a matter of the days to come. They
condemned khvostism and bluntly issued the slogan even of a popular
armed insurrection, not in the sense of a direct appeal (Mr. Struve
would not discover any appeals to "riots" in our utterances
of that period), but in the sense of a necessary deduction, in the sense
of "propaganda" (about which Mr. Struve has bethought himself
only now—our honourable Mr. Struve is always several years behind
the times), in the sense of preparing those very "social-psychological
conditions" about which the representatives of the bewildered,
huckstering bourgeoisie are now holding forth "sadly and inappropriately."
At that time propaganda and agitation, agitation and propaganda, were
really pushed to the fore by the objective state of affairs. At that
time the work of publishing an all-Russian political newspaper, the
weekly issuance of which was regarded as an ideal, could be proposed
(and was proposed in What Is To Be Done?) as the touchstone of the work
of preparing for an insurrection. At that time the slogans advocating
mass agitation instead of direct armed action, preparation of the social-psychological
conditions for insurrection instead of flash-in-the-pan methods, were
the only correct slogans for the revolutionary Social-Democratic movement.
At the present time the slogans have been superseded by events, the
movement has left them behind, they have become tatters, rags fit only
to cloth the hypocrisy of the Osvobozhdeniye and of the new Iskra tailism!
Or perhaps
I am mistaken? Perhaps the revolution has not yet begun? Perhaps the
time for open political action of classes has not yet arrived? Perhaps
there is still no civil war, and the criticism of weapons should not
as yet be the necessary and obligatory successor, heir, trustee and
wielder of the weapon of criticism?
Look around,
poke your head out of your study and look into the street for an answer.
Has not the government itself started civil war by shooting down hosts
of peaceful and unarmed citizens everywhere? Are not the armed Black
Hundreds acting as "arguments" of the autocracy? Has not the
bourgeoisie—even the bourgeoisie—recognised the need for
a citizens' militia? Does not Mr. Struve himself, the ideally moderate
and punctilious Mr. Struve, say (alas, he says so only to evade the
issue!) that "the open nature of revolutionary action" (that's
the sort of fellows we are today!) "is now one of the most important
conditions for exerting an educational influence upon the masses of
the people"?
Those who
have eyes to see can have no doubt as to how the question of armed insurrection
must be presented by the partisans of revolution at the present time.
Just take a look at the three ways in which this question has been presented
in the organs of the free press which are at all capable of influencing
the masses.
Presentation
one. The resolution of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party. It is publicly acknowledged and declared that the general
democratic revolutionary movement has already brought about the necessity
of an armed insurrection. The organisation of the proletariat for an
insurrection has been placed on the order of the day as one of the essential,
principal and indispensable tasks of the Party. Instructions are issued
to adopt the most energetic measures to arm the proletariat and to ensure
the possibility of directly leading the insurrection.
The second
presentation. An article in the Osvobozhdeniye, containing a statement
of principles, by the "leader of the Russian constitutionalists"
(as Mr. Struve was recently described by such an influential organ of
the European bourgeoisie as the Frankfurter Zeitung), or the leader
of the Russian progressive bourgeoisie. He does not share the opinion
that an insurrection is inevitable. Secret activity and riots are the
specific methods of irrational revolutionism. Republicanism is a method
of stunning. The question of armed insurrection is really a mere technical
question, whereas "the fundamental and most necessary task"
is to carry on mass propaganda and to prepare the social-psychological
conditions.
The third
presentation. The resolution of the new Iskra-ist Conference. Our task
is to prepare an insurrection. A planned insurrection is out of the
question. Favourable conditions for an insurrection are created by the
disorganisation of the government, by our agitation, and by our organisation.
Only then "can technical military preparations acquire more or
less serious significance."
And is
that all? Yes, that is all. The new Iskra-ist leaders of the proletariat
still do not know whether insurrection has become a necessity. It is
still not clear to them whether the task of organising the proletariat
for direct battle has become an urgent one. It is not necessary to urge
the adoption of the most energetic measures; it is far more important
(in 1905, and not in 1902) to explain in general outlines under what
conditions these measures "may" acquire "more or less
serious" significance. . . .
Do you
see now, comrades of the new Iskra, where your turn to Martynovism has
led you? Do you realise that your political philosophy has proved to
be a rehash of the Osvobozhdeniye philosophy?—that (against your
will and with out your being aware of it) you are following at the tail
of the monarchist bourgeoisie? Is it clear to you now that, while repeating
what you have learned by rote and attaining perfection in sophistry,
you have lost sight of the fact that—in the memorable words of
Peter Struve's memorable article—"the open nature of revolutionary
action is now one of the most important conditions for exerting an educational
influence upon the masses of the people"?
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