Marcus
Tullius Cicero was the eldest son of an equestrian, though not noble,
family. He was born 105 B.C. and was beheaded by Antony's soldiers in
43 B.C. The path open for political honors to a "new man"
[i.e., no one of whose family had held a magistracy in Rome] was through
the law, and at twenty-six, after a thorough Greek and Latin education,
Cicero pleaded his first case. The next year he successfully defended
Publius Sextus Roscius against the favorite of Sulla, the dictator,
and thought it best, during the rest of Sulla's dictatorship, to travel
for his education and his health. At thirty-two he was elected quaestor
to Sicily, and because of his integrity while holding this magistracy,
was soon afterwards chosen by the Sicilians to prosecute their former
governor Verres for extortion. Cicero was curule aedile in 69 B.C.,
praetor urbanus in 66 B.C. In this year he supported Pompey for the
eastern command, and the two never quite ceased to be friends. Cicero
was consul in 63 B.C., and put down the conspiracy of Catiline.
Sulla's
constitution had been gradually changing since his death, and Cicero
slowly came to side with the optimates as against the populares and
to try to carry the equestrians with him. He might have been a member
of the "First Triumvirate" but perhaps preferred the existing
institutions to such high-handed measures. In 58 B.C. he was exiled
through the efforts of the demagogue Publius Clodius, but was recalled
the next year. When civil war broke out between Caesar and Pompey, Cicero
tried to side with neither, but at length joined Pompey's army in Epirus.
After the defeat of the latter at Pharsalus, Cicero, whom sickness had
kept from the battle, returned to Italy and sought pardon of Caesar.
When Caesar was assassinated four years later, Cicero saw visions of
the old republican government revived once more, and delivered his fierce
philippics against Antony; but upon the coalition of Octavius and Antony,
was proscribed by Antony and killed by the latter's soldiers.
Book
II
4. Marcus:
Let us, then, once more examine, before we come to the consideration
of particular laws, what is the power and nature of law in general;
lest, when we come to refer everything to it, we occasionally make mistakes
from the employment of incorrect language, and show ourselves ignorant
of the force of those terms which we ought to employ in the definition
of laws.
Quintus:
This is a very necessary caution, and the proper method of seeking truth.
Marcus:
This, then, as it appears to me, has been the decision of the wisest
philosophers---that law was neither a thing to be contrived by the genius
of man, nor established by any decree of the people, but a certain eternal
principle, which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what
is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Therefore, they called that
aboriginal and supreme law the mind of God, enjoining or forbidding
each separate thing in accordance with reason. On which account it is
that this law, which the gods have bestowed upon the human race, is
so justly applauded. For it is the reason and mind of a wise Being equally
able to urge us to good or to deter us from evil.
Quintus:
You have, on more than one occasion, already touched on this topic.
But before you come to treat of the laws of nations, I wish you would
endeavor to explain the force and power of this divine and celestial
law, lest the torrent of custom should overwhelm our understanding,
and betray us into the vulgar method of expression.
Marcus:
From our childhood we have learned, my Quintus, to call such phrases
as this "that a man appeals to justice, and goes to law,"
and many similar expressions "law," but, nevertheless, we
should understand that these, and other similar commandments and prohibitions,
have sufficient power to lead us on to virtuous actions and to call
us away from vicious ones. Which power is not only far more ancient
than any existence of states and people, but is coeval with God himself,
who beholds and governs both heaven and earth. For it is impossible
that the divine mind can exist in a state devoid of reason; and divine
reason must necessarily be possessed of a power to determine what is
virtuous and what is vicious. Nor, because it was nowhere written, that
one man should maintain the pass of a bridge against the enemy's whole
army, and that he should order the bridge behind him to be cut down,
are we therefore to imagine that the valiant Cocles [i.e., Horatius]
did not perform this great exploit agreeably to the laws of nature and
the dictates of true bravery. Again, though in the reign of Tarquin
there was no written law concerning adultery, it does not therefore
follow that Sextus Tarquinius did not offend against the eternal law
when he committed a rape on Lucretia, daughter of Tricipitius. For,
even then he had the light of reason from the nature of things, that
incites to good actions and dissuades from evil ones; and which does
not begin for the first time to be a law when it is drawn up in writing,
but from the first moment that it exists. And this existence of moral
obligation is co-eternal with that of the divine mind. Therefore, the
true and supreme law, whose commands and prohibitions are equally authoritative,
is the right reason of the Sovereign Jupiter.
5. Quintus:
I grant you, my brother, that whatever is just is also at all times
the true law; nor can this true law either be originated or abrogated
by the written forms in which decrees are drawn up.
Marcus:
Therefore, as that Divine Mind, or reason, is the supreme law, so it
exists in the mind of the sage, so far as it can be perfected in man.
But with respect to civil laws, which are drawn up in various forms,
and framed to meet the occasional requirements of the people, the name
of law belongs to them not so much by right as by the favor of the people.
For men prove by some such arguments as the following, that every law
which deserves the name of a law, ought to be morally good and laudable.
It is clear, say they, that laws were originally made for the security
of the people, for the preservation of states, for the peace and happiness
of society; and that they who first framed enactments of that kind,
persuaded the people that they would write and publish such laws only
as should conduce to the general morality and happiness, if they would
receive and obey them. And then such regulations, being thus settled
and sanctioned, they justly entitled Laws. From which we may reasonably
conclude, that those who made unjustifiable and pernicious enactments
for the people, acted in a manner contrary to their own promises and
professions, and established anything rather than laws, properly so
called, since it is evident that the very signification of the word
"law" comprehends the whole essence and energy of justice
and equity. I would, therefore, interrogate you on this point, my Quintus,
as those philosophers are in the habit of doing. If a state wants something
for the want of which it is reckoned no state at all, must not that
something be something good?
Quintus:
A very great good.
Marcus:
And if a state has no law, is it not for that reason to be reckoned
no state at all?
Quintus:
We must needs say so.
Marcus:
We must therefore reckon law among the very best things.
Quintus:
I entirely agree with you.
Marcus:
If, then, in the majority of nations, many pernicious and mischievous
enactments are made, which have no more right to the name of law than
the mutual engagement of robbers, are we bound to call them laws? For
as we cannot call the recipes of ignorant and unskillful empirics, who
give poisons instead of medicines, the prescriptions of a physician,
so likewise we cannot call that the true law of a people, of whatever
kind it may be, if it enjoins what is injurious, let the people receive
it as they will. For law is the just distinction between right and wrong,
made conformable to that most ancient nature of all, the original and
principal regulator of all things, by which the laws of men should be
measured, whether they punish the guilty or protect and preserve the
innocent.
6. Quintus:
I quite understand you, and think that no law but that of justice should
either be proclaimed as one or enforced as one.
Marcus:
Then you regard as null and void the laws of Titius and Apuleius, because
they are unjust.
Quintus:
Yes; and I would say the same of the laws of Livius.
Marcus:
You are right, and so much more the more, since a single vote of the
senate would be sufficient to abrogate them in an instant. But that
law of justice, the power of which I have explained, can never be abrogated.
Certainly, if I could get you both to agree with me. But Plato, that
wisest of all men, that most dignified of all philosophers, who was
the first man who ever composed a treatise on a Commonwealth, and afterwards
a separate one on Laws, induces me to follow his illustrious example,
and to proclaim the praises of law, before I begin to recite its regulations.
Such, likewise, was the practice of Zaleucus and Charondas, who wrote
the laws which they gave their cities, not for the sake of study or
amusement, but for the benefit of their country and their fellow-citizens.
And imitating them, Plato considered that it was the property of law,
to persuade in some instances, and not to compel everything by threats
and violence.
Quintus:
What, do you venture to cite Zaleucus, when Timaeus denies that he ever
existed ?
Marcus:
But Theophrastus, an author, in my opinion, quite as respectable, and
as may think, much more so, corroborates my statement. His fellow-citizens,
too, my clients, the Locrians, commemorate him; but whether he was a
real man or not, is of no great consequence to our argument; we are
only speaking according to tradition.
7. Let
this, therefore, be a fundamental principle in all societies, that the
gods are the supreme lords and governors of all things---that all events
are directed by their influence, and wisdom, and Divine power; that
they deserve very well of the race of mankind; and that they likewise
know what sort of person every one really is; that they observe his
actions, whether good or bad; that they take notice with what feelings
and with what piety he attends to his religious duties, and that they
are sure to make a difference between the good and the wicked.
For when
once our minds are confirmed in these views, it will not be difficult
to inspire them with true and useful sentiments. For what can be more
true than that no man should be so madly presumptuous as to believe
that he has either reason or intelligence, while he does not believe
that the heaven and the world possess them likewise, or to think that
those things which he can scarcely comprehend by the greatest possible
exertion of his intellect, are put in motion without the agency of reason?
In truth,
we can scarcely reckon him a man, whom neither the regular courses of
the stars, nor the alterations of day and night, nor the temperature
of the seasons, nor the productions that nature displays for his use
and enjoyment, urge to gratitude towards heaven.
And as
those beings which are furnished with reason are incomparably superior
to those which want it, and as we cannot say, without impiety, that
anything is superior to the universal Nature, we must therefore confess
that divine reason is contained within her. And who will dispute the
utility of these sentiments, when he reflects how many cases of the
greatest importance are decided by oaths; how much the sacred rites
performed in making treaties tend to assure peace and tranquility; and
what numbers of people the fear of divine punishment has reclaimed from
a vicious course of life; and how sacred the social rights must be in
a society where a firm persuasion obtains the immediate intervention
of the immortal gods, both as witnesses and judges of our actions? Such
is the "preamble of the law," to use the expression of Plato.
Quintus:
I understand you, my brother; and I am greatly pleased to find that
you take a different view of the subject, and dwell upon other points
of it, than those which he selects, for nothing can less resemble his
opinions, than what you have just now asserted, even in this preamble.
The only matter in which you seem to me to imitate him, is his style
and language.
Marcus:
I wish, indeed, I did, but who is, or who ever will be able to translate
them, and, indeed, that is what I should do if I did not wish to be
altogether original. For what difficulty is there in stating the same
doctrines as he does, translated from him almost word for word?
Quintus:
I entirely agree with you; for as you have just remarked, your arguments
ought to be entirely your own. Begin, then, if you will do us a favor,
and expound the laws of religion.
Marcus:
I will explain them as well as I can; and since both the topic and the
conversation is a familiar one, I shall begin by describing the laws
of laws.
Quintus:
What laws do you mean?
Marcus:
There are certain terms in law, my Quintus, not so ancient as those
in the primitive sacred laws, but still, in order to carry with them
greater authority, being of a somewhat greater antiquity than the common
parlance of people. These legal terms, I shall mention with as much
brevity as possible; and I shall endeavor to expound the laws, not,
indeed, in their whole extent, for this would be a boundless subject,
but those which involve the principles, and contain the sum and substance
of the rest.
Quintus:
This appears a most desirable method; let us therefore hear the terms
of the law.
8. Quintus:
Such are the following:---Let men approach the gods with purity---let
men appear before them in the spirit of devotion---let men remove riches
from their temples; whoever does otherwise shall suffer the vengeance
of heaven---let no one have private gods---neither new gods nor strange
gods, unless publicly acknowledged, are to be worshiped privately---let
the temples which our fathers have constructed in the cities, be upheld---let
the people maintain the groves in the country, and the abodes of the
Lares---let men preserve the customs of their fathers and of their family---let
the gods who have been accounted celestial be worshiped, and those likewise
who have merited celestial honors by their illustrious actions, such
as Hercules, Bacchus, Aesculapius, Castor, Pollux, and Quirinus. Let
due honor be likewise paid to those virtues, by which man is exalted
to heaven---as Intelligence, Valor, Piety, Fidelity; and let temples
be consecrated to their honor---with regard to the vices, let no sacred
sacrifices be paid to them.
Let men
put aside all contentions of every kind on the sacred festivals, and
let servants enjoy them, their toils being remitted, for therefore they
were appointed at certain seasons.---Let the priests duly render the
public thank-offerings to heaven, with herbs and fruits, on the sacrificial
days. Also, on the appointed holidays, let them offer up the cream of
milk, and the sucklings; and lest the priests should commit any mistakes
in these sacrifices, or the season of these sacrifices, let them carefully
observe the calendar, and the revolutions of the stars.---Let them provide
those particular victims which are most appropriate and agreeable to
each particular deity.---Let the different gods have different orders
of priests.---Let them all have pontiffs in common; and let each separate
god have his Flamen.
Let the
Vestal Virgins in the city carefully keep the eternal fire of the public
altar always burning; and, that this may be done both publicly and privately
with all due form and ceremony, let those who are not instructed in
the order of the ceremonials learn it from the public priests. Let there
be two classes of these priests, one to preside over ceremonials and
sacrifices, and the other to interpret the obscure predictions of the
prophets and diviners, whenever the senate and the people require it.
Let the public Augurs, who are the interpreters of the all-good and
all-great Jupiter, likewise examine the presages and the auspices, according
to the discipline of their art. Let the priests who are conversant in
auguries implore prosperity for the vineyards and gardens, and pray
for the general welfare of the people. Let those who give counsel in
military or civic affairs attend to the auspices, and be guided by them.
Let them guard against the anger of heaven, and appease it; and observe
from what part of heaven the lightnings burst forth. Let them declare
what lands, cities, and temples, are to be held free and consecrated.
Whatever things the augur declares to be unjust, ill-omened, vicious,
and accursed, let them be forsaken as prohibited and disastrous, and
whoever will not obey these divine indications, let him suffer capital
punishment.
9. As to
alliances, peace, war, truces, and the rights of ambassadors, let the
two Fetiales be the appropriate judges, and let them determine all questions
relating to military affairs. Let them report all prodigies and portents
to the Etruscans and soothsayers, if the senate orders it; and let the
chiefs of Etruria explain their system. Then will they learn what deities
it behooves them to propitiate, and deprecate the fury of the thunderbolt
against the object of its vengeance.
Let there
be no nocturnal sacrifices performed by women, except those which they
offer according to custom on behalf of the people; and let none be initiated
in the mysteries except by the usual forms consecrated to Ceres, according
to the Grecian ceremonials.
A crime
which has been committed and cannot be expiated has been an act of impiety;
as to the faults which can be expiated, let the public priests expiate
them.
Let men
temper the public hilarity with song, and harp, and flute at the public
games, as far as can be done without the games of the racecourse and
the wrestling-matches, and let them unite these amusements with the
honors of the gods. Let them retain whatever is best and purest in the
ancient form of worship. Except the devotees of Cybele, to whom this
privilege is allowed on certain days, let no one presume to levy rates
for private emolument. Whoever purloins or robs any temple, or steals
any property deposited in a temple, shall be accounted a parricide.
The divine punishment of perjury is destruction---the human penalty
is infamy. With regard to incest, let the chief priest sentence it to
the extreme penalty of the law.
Let not
the impious man attempt to appease the gods by gifts and offerings.
Let vows be carefully performed. Wherever law is violated let its punishments
be executed. Let no private person presume to consecrate his land; and
let his consecration of gold, silver, and ivory, be made within the
limits of moderation. Let the sacred actions of private persons be preserved
for ever. Let the rights of the deities of the dead be considered sacred.
Let those who have passed into the world of souls be considered as deified!
but let men diminish the unnecessary expense and sorrow which is lavished
on them.
10. Atticus:
You have managed to include a great deal of law in a very small compass;
but it seems to me, that this class of religious maxims does not much
differ from the Laws of Numa and our national regulations.
Marcus:
Do you suppose, then, that when, in my Treatise on the Commonwealth,
Scipio appears to be arguing that our ancient Roman Commonwealth was
the best of all republics, it was not indispensable that I should give
laws of corresponding excellence to that best of all republics?
Atticus:
Undoubtedly I think you should.
Marcus:
Well, then, you may expect such laws as may embrace that most perfect
kind of republic. And if any others should haply be demanded of me this
day, which are not to be found, and never have existed, in our Roman
Commonwealth, yet even these formed a portion of the customs of our
ancestors, which at that time were maintained as religiously as the
laws themselves.
Book III.
1. Marcus:
I shall, therefore, imitate that divine man, who has inspired me with
such admiration that I eulogize him perhaps oftener than is necessary.
Atticus:
You mean Plato.
Marcus:
The very man, my Atticus.
Atticus:
Indeed you do not exaggerate your compliments, nor bestow them too frequently,
for even my Epicurean friends, who do not like any one to be praised
but their own master, still allow me to love Plato as much as I like.
Marcus:
They do well to grant you this indulgence, for what can be so suitable
to the elegance of your taste as the writings of Plato, who in his life
and manners appears to me to have succeeded in that most difficult combination
of gravity and politeness.
Atticus:
I am glad I interrupted you, since you have availed yourself of an opportunity
of giving this splendid testimonial of your judgment respecting him;
but to pursue the subject as you began.
Marcus:
Let us begin, then, with praising the law itself, with those commendations
which are both deserved and appropriate to the subject.
Atticus:
That is but fair, since you did the same in the case of our ecclesiastical
jurisprudence.
Marcus:
You see, then, that this is the duty of magistrates, to superintend
and prescribe all things which are just and useful, and in accordance
with the law. For as the law is set over the magistrate, even so are
the magistrates set over the people. And, therefore, it may be truly
said "that the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law is a silent
magistrate." Moreover, nothing is so conformable to justice and
to the condition of nature (and when I use that expression, I wish it
to be understood that I mean the law, and nothing else) as sovereign
power; without which, neither house, nor commonwealth, nor nation, nor
mankind itself, nor the entire nature of things, nor the universe itself,
could exist. For this universe is obedient to God, and land and sea
are submissive to the universe; and human life depends on the just administration
of the laws of the universe; and human life depends on the just administration
of the laws of order.
2. But
to come to considerations nearer home, and more familiar to us, all
ancient nations have been at one time or other under the dominion of
kings. Which kind of authority was at first conferred on the wisest
and justest of men (and this rule mainly prevailed in our own commonwealth,
as long as the regal power lasted). Afterward, the authority of kings
was handed down in succession to their descendants, and this practice
remains to this day in those which are governed by kings. And even those
to whom the regal domination was distasteful, did not desire to be obedient
to no one, but only to be always under the authority of the same person.
For ourselves,
then, as we are proposing laws for a free people, and we have already
set forth in six books all our own opinions about the best kind of commonwealth,
we shall on the present occasion endeavor to accommodate our laws to
that constitutional government of which we have expressed our approval.
It is clear,
then, that magistrates are absolutely necessary; since, without their
prudence and diligence, a state cannot exist; and since it is by their
regulations that the whole commonwealth is kept within the bounds of
moderation. But it is not enough to prescribe them a rule of domination,
unless we likewise prescribe the citizens a rule of obedience. For he
who commands well, must at some time or other have obeyed; and he who
obeys with modesty appears worthy of some day or other being allowed
to command. It is desirable, therefore, that he who obeys should expect
that some day he will come to command, and that he who commands should
bear in mind that ere long he may be called to the duty of submission.
We would
not, however, limit ourselves to requiring from the citizens submission
and obedience towards their magistrates; we would also enjoin them by
all means to honor and love their rulers, as Charondas prescribes in
his code. Our Plato likewise declares that they are of the race of the
Titans, who, as they rebelled against the heavenly deities, do in like
manner oppose their magistrates. These points being granted, we will,
if you please, advance to the examination of the laws themselves.
Atticus:
I certainly do please, and the arrangement seems advisable.
3. Marcus:
Let all authorities be just, and let them be honestly obeyed by the
people with modesty and without opposition. Let the magistrate restrain
the disobedient and mischievous citizen, by fine, imprisonment, and
corporal chastisement; unless some equal or greater power, or the people
forbid it; for there should be an appeal thereto. If the magistrate
shall have decided, and inflicted a penalty, let there be a public appeal
to the people respecting the penalty and fine imposed.
With respect
to the army, and the general that commands it by martial law, there
should be no appeal from his authority. And whatever he who conducts
the war commands, shall be absolute law, and ratified as such.
As to the
minor magistrates, let there be such a distribution of their legal duties,
that each may more effectively superintend his own department of justice.
In the army let those who are appointed command, and let them have tribunes.
In the city, let men be appointed as superintendents of the public treasury.
Let some devote their attention to the prison discipline, and capital
punishments. Let others supervise the public coinage of gold, and silver,
and copper. Let others judge suits and arbitrations; and let others
carry the orders of the senate into execution.
Let there
likewise be aediles, curators of the city, the provisions, and the public
games, and let these offices be the first steps to higher promotions
of honor.
Let the
censors take a census of the people, according to age, offspring, family,
and property. Let them have the inspection of the temples, the streets,
the aqueducts, the rates, and the customs. Let them distribute the citizens,
according to their tribes; after that let them divide them with reference
to their fortunes, ages, and ranks. Let them keep a register of the
families of those of the equestrian and plebeian orders. Let them impose
a tax on celibates. Let them guard the morals of the people. Let them
permit no scandal in the senate. Let the number of such censors be two.
Let their magistracy continue five years. Let the other magistrates
be annual, but their offices themselves should be perpetual.
Let the
judge of the law who shall decide private actions, or send them for
decision to the praetor---let him be the proper guardian of civil jurisprudence.
Let him have as many colleagues of equal power, as the senate think
necessary, and the people allows him.
Let two
magistrates be invested with sovereign authority; from their presiding,
judging, and counseling, let them be called praetors, judges, or consuls.
Let them have supreme authority over the army, and let them be subject
to none; for the safety of the people is the supreme law; and no one
should succeed to this magistracy till it has been held ten years---regulating
the duration by an annual law.
When a
considerable war is undertaken, or discord is likely to ensue among
the citizens, let a single supreme magistrate be appointed, who shall
unite in his own person the authority of both consuls, if the senate
so decrees, for six months only. And when such a magistrate has been
proclaimed under favorable auspices, let him be the master of the people.
Let him have for a colleague, with equal powers with himself, a knight
whomsoever he may choose to appoint, as judge of the law. And when such
a dictator or master of the people is created the other magistrates
shall be suppressed.
Let the
auspices be observed by the senate, and let them authorize persons of
their body to elect the consuls in the Comitia, according to the established
ceremonials.
Let the
commanders, generals, and lieutenants, leave the city whenever the senate
decrees or the people orders that they shall do so. Let them properly
prosecute all just wars. Let them spare our allies, and restrain themselves
and their subordinates. Let them increase the glory of our country.
Let them return home with honor. Let no one be made an ambassador with
a view to his own interest.
Let the
ten officers whom the people elect to protect them against oppression
be their tribunes; and let all their prohibitions and adjudications
be established, and their persons considered inviolable, so that tribunes
may never be wanting to the people.
Let all
magistrates possess their auspices and jurisdictions, and let the senate
be composed of these legitimate authorities. Let its ordinances be absolute,
and let its enactments be written and ratified, unless an equal or greater
authority disannul them. Let the order of the senators be free from
reproach and scandal, and let them be an example of virtue to all.
In the
creation of magistrates, the judgment of the accused, and the reception
or rejection of laws, when suffrages are employed, let the suffrages
be at once notorious to the nobles, and free to the people.
4. If any
question occur out of the established jurisdiction of the magistrates,
let another magistrate be appointed by the people, whose jurisdiction
shall expressly extend thereto. Let the consul, the praetor, the censor,
the master of the people and of the equites, and he to whom the senate
has committed the election of consuls, have full liberty to treat both
with the senate and the people, and endeavor to reconcile the interests
of all parties. Let the tribunes of the people likewise have free access
to the senate, and advocate the interests of the people in all their
deliberations. Let a just moderation predominate in the opinions and
declarations of those who would thus act as mediators between the senate
and the people. Let a senator who does not attend the senate, either
show cause of his non-attendance, or submit to an appropriate fine.
Let a senator speak in his turn, with all moderation, and let him be
thoroughly acquainted with the interests of the people.
By all
means avoid violence among the people. Let the greatest authority have
the greatest weight in decisions. If any one shall disturb the public
harmony, and foment party quarrels, let him be punished as a criminal.
To act the intercessor in cases of offence should be considered the
part of a good citizen. Let those who act observe the auspices; obey
the public augur, and carry into effect all proclamations, taking care
that they are exhibited in the treasury and generally known. Let the
public consultations be concentrated in one point at a time, let them
instruct the people in the nature of the question, and let all the magistrates
and the people be permitted to advise on the subject.
Let them
permit no monopolies, or privileges. With respect to the capital punishment
of any citizen, let it not take place, unless by the adjudication of
the high courts of justice, and the ministry of those whom the censors
have placed over the popular orders. Let no bribes be given or received,
either in soliciting, discharging, or resigning an official situation.
If any
one infringe any of these laws, let him be liable to penalty. Let these
regulations be committed to the charge of the censors. Let public officers,
on their retiring from their posts, gives the censors an account of
their conduct, but let them not by this means escape from legal prosecution
if they have been guilty of corruption.
I have
here recited the whole law; now, consider the question, and give your
votes.
5. Quintus:
With what conciseness, my brother, have you brought before our eyes
the duties and offices of all magistrates! But your system of laws is
almost that of our own commonwealth, although a little that is new has
also been added by you.
Marcus:
Your observation is very just, my Quintus, for this is the very system
of a commonwealth which Scipio eulogizes in my treatise, and which he
mainly approves---and which cannot be kept in operation but by a successive
order of magistrates, such as we have described. For you may take it
for granted that it is the establishment of magistrates that gives its
form to a commonwealth, and it is exactly by their distribution and
subordination that we must determine the nature of the constitution.
Which establishment being very wisely and discretely settled by our
ancestors, there is nothing, or at all events very little alteration
that I think necessary in the laws.