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On
Organization
In dealing
with the sum of money under discussion and the other matters referred
to this Assembly, I see no difficulty, men of Athens, in either of two
methods: I may attack the officials who assign and distribute the public
funds and may thus gain credit with those who regard this system as
detrimental to the State, or I may approve and commend the right to
receive these doles and so gratify those who are especially in need
of them. For neither class has the interest of the State in view, when
they approve or complain of the system, but they are prompted respectively
by their poverty or their affluence.
I myself
would neither propose such a distribution of the doles, nor oppose the
right to receive them; but I do urge you to reflect seriously in your
own minds that while the sum of money you are discussing is a trifle,
the habit of mind that it fosters is a serious matter. Now if you so
organize the receipt of money that it is associated with the performance
of duties, so far from injuring, you will actually confer on the State
and on yourselves the greatest benefit; but if a festival or any other
pretext is good enough to justify a dole, and yet you refuse even to
listen to the suggestion that there is any obligation attached to it,
beware lest you end by acknowledging that what you now consider a proper
practice was a grievous error.
My idea
of our duty--do not drown with your clamor what I am about to say, but
hear me before you judge--my idea is that, as we have devoted a meeting
of the Assembly to the question of receiving the dole, so we ought also
to devote a meeting to organization and to equipment for war; and everyone
must show himself not merely ready to hear what is said, but also willing
to act, so that you may depend on yourselves, Athenians, for your hopes
of success, and not be always asking what service this individual or
that is rendering.
The total
revenues of the State, including your own resources, now squandered
on unnecessary objects, and the contributions of your allies, must be
shared by each citizen equally, as pay by those of military age and
as overseers' fees, or whatever you like to call it, by those beyond
the age-limit; and you must serve in person and not resign that duty
to others, but our army must be a national force, equipped from the
resources I have named, so that you may be well provided for the performance
of your task, and that we may have no repetition of what usually happens
now, when you are always bringing your generals to trial and the net
result of your exertions is the announcement that “So-and-so,
the son of So-and-so, has impeached So-and-so.”
But what
is to be the result for you? In the first place, that your allies may
be kept loyal, not by maintaining garrisons among them, but by making
their interests identical with yours; next, that our generals may not
lead mercenaries to the plunder of our allies without even coming in
sight of the enemy, so that the profit is all their own, while the State
at large incurs the hatred and the abuse, but that they may have their
own citizens at their back, and may so deal with our enemies as they
now deal with our friends.
But apart
from this, many operations demand your actual presence, and beside the
advantage of using a national force in a national quarrel, this is necessary
on every other ground. For if you were content to let things slide and
not worry about the state of Greece, it would be another matter.
But, as
it is, you claim to take the lead and to determine the rights of other
states; yet neither in the past nor today have you furnished a sufficient
force to superintend and secure this claim. On the contrary, it was
when you stood utterly aloof and indifferent that the democracies of
Mytilene and of Rhodes were destroyed. “Yes, but Rhodes was our
enemy,” you may say.
But you
should consider, men of Athens, that our hostility towards oligarchies,
purely on the ground of principle, is stronger than our hostility towards
democracies on any grounds whatever. But to return to my point. My view
is that you must be brought under a system, and there must be a uniform
scheme for receiving public money and for performing necessary services.
I have addressed you before on this subject and have described the method
of organizing you, whether you serve in the infantry or the cavalry
or in other ways, and also how ample provision may be ensured for all
alike.
I will
tell you without any concealment what has caused me most disappointment.
It is that though the many reforms proposed were all of them important
and honorable, no one remembers any of them, but everyone remembers
the two obols.1 Yet these can never be worth more than two obols, but
the other reforms, together with those that I proposed, are worth all
the wealth of the Great King--that a city, so well provided with infantry,
triremes, cavalry, and revenues, should be duly organized and equipped.
Why then,
you may ask, do I choose the present time for these remarks? Because
I think that, as the principle that all citizens should serve for pay
is displeasing to some people, and yet the advantage of organization
and equipment is approved by all, you ought to begin the business at
this point, giving everyone a chance of stating his views on the subject.
For the case stands thus: if you are convinced that now is the opportunity
for these reforms, all things will be ready when the need of them arrives,
but if you pass over the opportunity as unsuitable, then, just when
you want to use them, you will be compelled to begin your preparations.
It has
been before now remarked, men of Athens, by some speaker--not one of
the great body of citizens, but one of those who are likely to have
a fit if these reforms are carried out--“What good have we ever
got from the speeches of Demosthenes? He comes forward, whenever he
thinks well, fills our ears with phrases, denounces our present state,
extols our ancestors, and then descends from the platform after raising
our hopes and inflating our pride.”
But if
I could only induce you to accept any of my proposals, I think that
I should confer such benefits on the State that if I tried to describe
them now, many of you would disbelieve them, as being too good to be
true. And yet even this too I consider no mean benefit, if I accustom
you to listen to the best advice. For he who would benefit the State,
Athenians, must first purge your ears, for they have been poisoned;
so many lies have you been accustomed to hear--anything, in fact, rather
than the best advice.
Let me
give you an instance, and let no one interrupt me till I have finished
my story. You know that a day or two ago the treasury of the Parthenon
was broken into. So the speakers in the Assembly, one and all, cried
that the democracy was overthrown, that the laws were null and void,
and so on. And yet, Athenians, though the culprits--mark whether my
words are true--deserved death, it is not through them that the democracy
is endangered. Again, a few oars were stolen. “Scourge the thieves
torture them,” cried the orators; “the democracy is in danger.”
But what is my opinion I say, like the others, that the thief deserves
death, but not that the democracy is endangered by such means.
The real
danger to democracy no one is bold enough to name; but I will name it.
It is in danger when you, men of Athens, are wrongly led, when in spite
of your numbers you are helpless, unarmed, unorganized and at variance,
when no general or anyone else pays any heed to your resolutions, when
no one cares to tell you the truth or set you right, when no one makes
an effort to remedy this state of things. And that is what always happens
now.
Yes, by
heavens, men of Athens, and there are other phrases, false and injurious
to the State, that have passed into your common speech, such as “In
the law-courts lies your salvation,” and “It is the ballot-box
that must save the State.” I know that these courts are sovereign
to uphold the rights of citizen against citizen, but it is by arms that
you must conquer the enemy, and upon arms depends the safety of the
State.
For resolutions
will not give your men victory in battle, but those who with the help
of arms conquer the enemy shall win for you power and security to pass
resolutions and to do what you will. For in the field you ought to be
terrible, but in the courts sympathetic.
If my
speeches seem to be greater than my own worth, that is itself a virtue
in them. For a speech, if it is to be delivered on behalf of this great
city and our wide interests, ought always to appear greater than the
individual who utters it; it ought to approximate to your reputation,
not to the reputation of the speaker. But none of the men whom you delight
to honor speaks like that, and I will tell you what their excuse is.
Men who
aim at office and at official rank go to and fro cringing to the favours
of the electorate; each one's ambition is to join the sacred ranks of
the generals, not to do a man's work. If anyone is really capable of
undertaking a job, he thinks that by exploiting the reputation and renown
of Athens, profiting by the absence of opposition, holding out hopes
to you and nothing but hopes, he will be sole inheritor of your advantages--and
so he is; but if you act as your own agents in every case, he will only
have his equal share with the rest, both in the labours and also in
their results.
The politicians,
absorbed in their profession, neglect to devise the best policy for
you and have joined the ranks of the office-seekers; and you conduct
your party-politics as you used to conduct your tax-paying--by syndicates.
There is an orator for chairman, with a general under him, and three
hundred to do the shouting. The rest of you are attached now to one
party and now to another. Hence all that you gain is that So-and-so
has a public statue and So-and-so makes his fortune--just one or two
men profiting at the expense of the State. The rest of you are idle
witnesses of their prosperity, surrendering to them, for the sake of
an easy life from day to day, the great and glorious prosperity which
is yours by inheritance.
Yet consider
how things were managed in the days of your ancestors, for you need
not go abroad for examples to teach you your duty. Take Themistocles,
who was your general in the sea-fight at Salamis, and Miltiades, who
commanded at Marathon, and many more whose good services were far greater
than those of our present generals: verily our ancestors put up no bronze
statues to them, but rewarded them as men in no way superior to themselves.
For truly,
men of Athens, they never robbed themselves of any of their achievements,
nor would anyone dream of speaking of Themistocles' fight at Salamis,
but of the Athenians' fight, nor of Miltiades' battle at Marathon, but
of the Athenians' battle. But now we often hear it said that Timotheus
took Corcyra, that Iphicrates cut up the Spartan detachment, or that
Chabrias won the sea-fight off Naxos. For you seem to waive your own
right to these successes by the extravagant honors which you have bestowed
on each of these officers.
Rewards
to citizens, rightly thus granted by our ancestors, are wrongly granted
by you. But how about foreigners? When Meno of Pharsalus gave twelve
talents of silver towards the war at Eion near Amphipolis and supported
us with two hundred cavalry of his own vassals, our ancestors did not
vote him the citizenship, but only gave him immunity from taxes.
On an earlier
occasion, when Perdiccas, who was king of Macedonia at the time of the
Persian invasions, destroyed the barbarians who were retreating after
their defeat at Plataea and so completed the discomfiture of the Great
King, they did not vote him the citizenship, but only gave him immunity
from taxes; because, I presume, they regarded their own country as great,
glorious, and venerable, and as something greater than any service rendered.
But now, Athenians, you make citizens of the scum of mankind, menial
sons of menial fathers, charging a price for it as for any other commodity.
You have
got into the habit of acting thus, not because in ability you are inferior
to your ancestors, but because it was second nature with them to have
a high opinion of themselves, while you, Athenians, have lost that virtue.
You cannot, I suppose, have a proud and chivalrous spirit, if your conduct
is mean and paltry, any more than your spirit can be mean and humble,
if your conduct is honorable and glorious; for whatever a man's pursuits
are, such must be his spirit.
But reflect
on what might be named as the outstanding achievements of your ancestors
and of yourselves, if haply the comparison may yet enable you to become
your own masters. For five and forty years they commanded the willing
obedience of the Greeks; more than ten thousand talents did they accumulate
in our Acropolis; many honorable trophies for victories on sea and on
land did they erect, in which even yet we take a pride. Yet remember
that they erected them, not that we might wonder as we gaze at them,
but that we might also imitate the virtues of the dedicators.
Thus did
our ancestors; but as for us, who have gained, as you all see, a clear
field, consider whether we can match them. Have we not wasted more than
fifteen hundred talents on the needy communities of Greece? Have we
not squandered our private estates, our public funds, and the contributions
of our allies? Have not the allies gained in war been lost in the peace?
But, it
may be said, in these respects alone things were better then than now,
but in other respects worse. Far from it; but let us examine any instance
you please. The buildings which they left behind them to adorn our city--temples,
harbors, and their accessories--were so great and so fair that we who
come after must despair of ever surpassing them; the Propylaea yonder,
the docks, the porticoes and the rest, with which they beautified the
city that they have bequeathed to us.
But the
private houses of those who rose to power were so modest and so in accordance
with the style of our constitution that the homes of their famous men,
of Themistocles and Cimon and Aristides, as any of you can see that
knows them, are not a whit more splendid than those of their neighbors.
But today,
men of Athens, while our public works are confined to the provision
of roads and fountains, whitewash and balderdash (and I blame, not those
who introduced these improvements--far from it!--but you, if you imagine
that these are all that is required of you ), private individuals, who
control any of the State-funds, have some of them reared private houses,
not merely finer than the majority, but more stately than our public
edifices, and others have purchased and cultivated estates more vast
than they ever dreamed of before.
The cause
of all this change is that then the people controlled and dispensed
everything, and the rest were well content to accept at their hand honor
and authority and reward; but now, on the contrary, the politicians
hold the purse-strings and manage everything, while the people are in
the position of lackeys and hangers-on, and you are content to accept
whatever your masters dole out to you.
Such, in
consequence, is the state of our public affairs that if anyone read
out your resolutions and then went on to describe your performances,
not a soul would believe that the same men were responsible for the
one and for the other. Take for instance the decrees that you passed
against the accursed Megarians, when they appropriated the sacred demesne,
that you should march out and prevent it and forbid it; in favour of
the Phliasians, when they were exiled the other day, that you should
help them and not give them up to their murderers, and should call for
volunteers from the Peloponnese.
That, Athenians,
was all very noble and right and worthy of our city; but the resultant
action was simply of no account. So your hostility is expressed in your
decrees, but action is beyond your control. Your decrees accord with
the traditions of Athens, but your powers bear no relation to your decrees.
I, however,
would advise you--do not be angry with me--either to humble yourselves
and be content to mind your own affairs, or else to get ready a more
powerful force. If I felt sure that you were Siphnians or Cythnians
or people of that sort, I should counsel you to be less proud, but since
you are Athenians, I urge you to get your force ready. For it would
be a disgrace, men of Athens, a disgrace to desert that post of honor
which your ancestors bequeathed to you.
But besides
it is no longer in your power, even if you wished it, to hold aloof
from Greek affairs. For you have many exploits to your credit from the
earliest times, and it would be disgraceful to abandon the friends you
have, while it is impossible to trust your enemies and allow them to
grow powerful. In short, you stand in the same position as your statesmen
stand to you--they cannot retire when they would; for you are definitely
involved in the politics of Greece.
XIII
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